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Introduction
Choices reveal preferences. This way an economist is able to draw conclusions from
observational data. This fundamental concept of revealed preferences works fine as long
as the choice environment is stable. However, often this is not the case and the choice
might be dependent on seemingly irrelevant factors. As one example, adding a dominated
alternative to the choice set might influence decisions. Explanations for this are that
the choice set might influence which attributes of the choice are focused on (Kőszegi and
Szeidl, 2013) or which are more salient (Bordalo et al., 2015). This example shows that
it is crucial to observe the choice environment and to have a clear understanding of how
the choice environment or context interact with the question at hand. Importantly, even
when the choice set is hold constant, choices might be influenced by other environmental
factors.
One prominent environmental factor, framing has been shown to have a strong impact
on decision making. Examples include the labeling of one option as the default, a different
form of presentation of the choice problem or describing outcomes as losses instead of
gains.
This dissertation consist of three self-contained chapters in each of which I discuss the
effects of an environmental change in the form of framing on decision behavior. Further,
while providing more evidence for framing effects particular interest lies on uncovering the
channels through which framing works. In all three chapters I use laboratory experiments
which allow tight control on the decision environment.
The concept of framing in itself is very broad. One definition is given by Salant and
Rubinstein (2008): “[A frame is additional,] observable information, other than the set of
feasible alternatives, which is irrelevant in the rational assessment of the alternatives but
nonetheless affects behavior”. The dependence of the choice on behavior is then defined
as a framing effect. In the chapters of this dissertation, I discuss different types of frames
in different domains which fall in this definition. In the first chapter I discuss a visual
frame, e.g., the appearance or layout of a document on investment decisions. In the
second chapter, I discuss altruistic behavior under different valence frames, and in the
third chapter, I study the effect of institutional framing on leadership effectiveness.
Framing poses an important challenge to the concept of revealed preferences which
shows that a better understanding of these effects is crucial. Given that choices are subject
to framing, this hampers the predictive power of economic models. In particular, purely
outcome based modes that fit behavior quite well in one frame might fail to predict
behavior in another frame. Consequently, even when one would be able to precisely
elicit preferences under one frame, this does not automatically translate into behavior
in another frame. Specifically, cooperative or individual behavior might not be fixed
but the outcome of an underlying mechanism which is influenced by framing. Thus,
some researchers suggest that in order to develop a complete theory of choice, “ancillary
conditions” like frames need to be taken into account (Bernheim and Rangel, 2007).
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In the first chapter we study the influence of a visual frame on financial decision
making1. In particular we are interested in the effectiveness of disclosures documents. Fi-
nancial disclosure documents provide investors with product details to facilitate informed
investment decisions. We investigate whether the appearance – the visual frame – of dis-
closure documents impacts risk and return expectations and investment behavior. In our
experiment, subjects decide about investments into real-life mutual funds. We find that
subjects expect a smaller return variance, invest more and gather less correct information
if visual distractors are present in the visual frame. Results are in line with the distracted
attention mechanism and suggest that disclosure policies should take the visual frame into
account.
There is rich empirical evidence that framing influences social decisions. However,
little is known about the underlying mechanisms behind framing effects. In Chapter 2
we study gain-loss framing in a binary modified dictator game2. Our main result is that
subjects choose the selfish option more often in the loss frame compared to the gain
frame. We use eye-tracking as an additional and complementary source of information.
Eye-fixations provide us with detailed insights on the process level of decision making and
show that dictators facing losses focus more on their own outcomes i.e., losses to their
own account compared to the losses to another subject. This suggests that losses to own
outcomes are weighted more than losses to another player.
In chapter 3 we study the effect of institutional framing on leadership in a public good
setting.3 Leadership mechanisms provide a potential means to mitigate social dilemmas,
but empirical evidence on the success of such mechanisms is mixed. In this chapter, we
explore the institutional frame as a relevant factor for the effectiveness of leadership. In
public-goods experiments that are either framed positively (give-some game) or negatively
(take-some game), we observe that leadership decisions are sensible to the institutional
frame. Moreover, we find that the marginal impact of leaders’ action on followers’ behav-
ior differs significantly between frames. Additionally, using a strategy method to elicit
followers’ reactions at the individual level, we find evidence for the malleability of follow-
ers’ revealed cooperation types. Taken together, the leadership institution is found to be
less efficient in the take- than in the give-frame, both in games that are played only once
and repeatedly.
1This chapter is based on Hillenbrand and Schmelzer (2015) and is joint work with André Schmelzer.
2This chapter is based on joint work with Susann Fiedler
3This chapter is based on Frackenpohl et al. (2016) and is joint work with Gerrit Frackenpohl and
Sebastian Kube.
2
1 Beyond Information: Disclosure, Distracted At-
tention and Investor Behavior
1.1 Introduction
Good investment decisions require the consideration of relevant information. However,
processing this information is a demanding exercise. Most investors have limited capacities
for handling it. Providing information in disclosure documents can help facilitate access
to and reception of pertinent information.
One regulatory response to the financial crisis of 2007-08 was aiming at improving
consumer financial decision-making by simplifying disclosures (see also Campbell et al.,
2011). More precisely, key investor documents (henceforth KIDs) were introduced as a
requirement for investment funds in the European Union (UCITS 2009/65/EC). These
mandatory documents aim at increasing understandability and comparability of financial
products for retail investors. Present rules regulate content and structure of the informa-
tion document.
Loewenstein et al. (2014) highlight the role of attention in decision-making based on
information disclosures. They state that psychological factors such as limited attention
can severely undermine the efficacy of disclosure as a public policy. Bhargava and Loewen-
stein (2015) argue that policy makers should protect consumers from firms exploiting their
inattention. We examine one consequence of limited attention: the possibility of being
distracted. Salience can be regarded as the other side of that coin (Bordalo et al., 2015).
In general, distracted attention and salience presuppose the limited resource of attention
studied for instance by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and DellaVigna and Pollet (2009).
If attention is key, we claim that the visual frame of disclosure documents becomes
crucial. We define visual frame as the frame encompassing information which does itself
not contain additional informational value about the product. This visual frame could
include firm-specific visual distractors. Visual distractors are parts of the frame that
distract attention from the content of the document. These could be banners or colors in
the document. Attention is prone to distraction in tasks requiring a high working memory
load (mental effort), such as reading disclosures (Lavie et al., 2004). By distracting
attention, the visual frame could impact decision-making.
In this paper we investigate whether standardizing the visual frame of disclosures
impacts risk and return expectations and investment behavior. We standardize the visual
frame by removing firm-related visual distractors. We employ a between-subjects design.
In our experiment, we compare investments in real-life mutual funds based on original
documents (original) with investments based on standardized documents (neutral). We
use real-life documents complying with the EU regulations. The laboratory setting enables
us to control the information environment and exclude additional distractors. This allows
us to infer a causal relation from changing the visual frame of disclosures on investment
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behavior.
We find that investments are significantly higher if visual distractors are present in the
document. Further, we elicit beliefs about expected returns. While the expected values
are on average similar in both treatments, the expected variance of returns is found to be
significantly smaller for investors facing visual distractors.
Our theoretical framework encompasses two potential psychological mechanisms: dis-
tracted attention and reinforced familiarity. Results are in line with the distracted atten-
tion mechanism: Individuals spent more time acquiring more correct information when
reading standardized documents. The documents are perceived as equally informative,
i.e., subjects reading the original documents are not aware that they capture less infor-
mation. Importantly, we find no evidence for familiarity interacting with the treatment
variation. In particular, we find no larger treatment differences concerning expected rate
of return and investments for familiar firms.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide experimental evidence that the
visual frame itself impacts expectations and choice behavior. Recent literature finds that
changing information in the document influences investment behavior (Bertrand et al.,
2010; Bertrand and Morse, 2011; Beshears et al., 2015). In this paper we change the
visual frame, while holding information constant.
Our work is related to the financial decision-making and portfolio choice literature.
In particular, we contribute to the literature on determinants of mutual fund investment
behavior. Here, it is commonly found that individuals do not invest optimally. Current
research finds that mutual fund investors disregard costs (Barber et al., 2006; Pontari
et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2010). Sirri and Tufano (1998) regard search costs to be a
major determinant of investment behavior. Search costs are argued to explain general
advertising effects in the mutual fund market (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Jain and Wu, 2000;
Lee et al., 2012). Also, the marketing literature suggests that strong and familiar brands
are able to generate an advantage through advertising (e.g., Hoeffler and Keller, 2003;
Stahl et al., 2012). In contrast, we find no interaction between familiarity and including
visual distractors (e.g., the logo) in our study.
One particular line of research focuses on the impact of changing the quality of in-
formation by presenting it in different formats. There is evidence that individuals focus
on graphical and salient information (Jarvenpaa, 1989). The perception of risk informa-
tion in graphical presentations is also found to impact portfolio choice by the degree of
aggregation of risk and return information (Kaufmann and Weber, 2013). In line with
these findings, de Goeij et al. (2014) claim that graphical representation of risk and return
may also have a debiasing effect. Bateman et al. (2016) find that the presentation of risk
disclosure influences choices. Weber et al. (2005) find that the presentation format of
historical returns and asset name familiarity impact expectations.
A second line of research focuses on the effect of changing the quantity of information
by comparing short and long disclosures. In particular, there is evidence specifically on
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KID disclosure documents. Results on the impact of a decreasing quantity of information
on mutual fund choice are mixed. Beshears et al. (2011) find that there is no effect on
portfolio choice comparing short and long disclosures. In contrast, Walther (2015) finds
that there is a positive effect of short information on perceived information quality and
a negative impact on information overload. The findings of Kozup et al. (2008) on short
disclosures are consistent with the literature on mutual funds. That is, investors are found
to discard costs and to focus on historical information. Again, we depart from both lines
of literature. We do not change information, but the visual frame.
From a policy perspective, our results indicate that the visual frame needs to be
considered in designing disclosure policies. On behalf of the European Commission (EC),
specific KID testings have been carried out (IFF Research and YouGov, 2009). The report
indicates that individuals prefer a risk indicator, ten years of past performance in a bar
chart, and costs displayed in a separate table. These suggestions have been implemented
in disclosure policies. The report of Chater et al. (2010), also prepared for the EC,
provides representative experimental evidence across EU countries that retail investors
are prone to biases and do not decide optimally. However, both reports are silent about
the visual frame.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the theoret-
ical framework and the hypotheses. Our experimental design and the treatment variation
is explained in section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents the main findings. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical framework
In this section we provide a theoretical framework to give our research question analytical
structure and to derive concise hypotheses. We adapt a model similar to Ko and Huang
(2007); Peress (2010) and Alti and Tetlock (2014). In contrast to these studies, we focus
on investor decision-making only. That is, we propose a three-period model in a one-sided
market setting. Since we are interested in the role of visual frames, we concentrate on the
updating process of integrating new information. We further depart from the literature by
integrating the perception of information in this information search model. Investment
choice can be influenced by various factors. In our setting, we include two behavioral
factors: Reinforced familiarity and distracted attention.
1.2.1 Setup
In line with the literature, an investor faces a portfolio choice between a risky and a safe
asset. Before making her decision, the investor can search for information about the risky
asset. In our experiment, this would correspond to reading a disclosure document. Given
the outcome of the information search, the investor updates her belief about the risky
asset. This translates into three time periods in figure 1 (as in Peress, 2010).
In t = 0, the investor has a subjective prior belief µ0 ∼ N(P, 1/p) about the rate of return
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Figure 1: Timing of actions.
of the risky asset, where P defines the subjective prior expected return of the risky asset
and p defines the precision of her prior (the inverse of the variance). Information search
starts in t = 0. In t = 1, the result of her search is realized as a signal. This corresponds to
the investor’s evaluation of the product based on the information obtained from reading
the disclosure document. The signal S is normally distributed around the actual rate of
return of the risky asset pi with S ∼ N(pi, 1/s), where s defines the precision of the signal.
In t = 1, the investor combines the information of her signal and her prior to form her
posterior belief µ1 ∼ N(p˜i, σ2) about the rate of return of the risky asset in t = 2. Given
this posterior, the investor chooses the optimal portfolio, i.e., the share x of money that
she invests in the risky asset. In t = 2, uncertainty is resolved and payoffs are realized.
1.2.2 Optimal portfolio choice
In line with Ko and Huang (2007) and Peress (2010), we assume that the investor has
CARA utility over final wealth U [W ] = −e−ρW with risk aversion parameter ρ > 0. That
is, we focus on risk aversion. In t = 1, the investor maximizes expected utility. Since
the posterior (µ1) is assumed to be normally distributed, final wealth is also normally
distributed. Due to these assumptions, we obtain the following mean-variance objective
function:
max
x
EU(W |µ1) = E[W ]− ρ2V ar[W ]. (1)
Final wealth (W ) consists of the payoff from investment in the risky asset and the payoff
from investment in the safe asset:
W = xW0pi + (1− x)W0, (2)
where W0 > 0 is the initial wealth in t = 0, x is the share invested in the risky asset, pi
is the actual rate of return of the risky asset, and 1 − x is the share invested in the safe
asset. We assume that the safe asset pays no interest. Substituting (2) in (1) leads to
xW0p˜i + (1− x)W0 − ρ2σ
2x2W 20 , (3)
where p˜i = E[pi] and σ2 is the variance of the posterior. We assume no short selling
(x ∈ [0, 1]).
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Then, the optimal investment amount in the risky asset X∗ = xW ∗0 is given by
X∗(ρ, p˜i, σ2) =
0 p˜i ≤ 1,min{W0, p˜i−1ρσ2 } else. (4)
As we see, the investor does not invest if the expected rate of return is below one. The
optimal amount invested in the risky asset is increasing in the posterior belief (bounded
by initial wealth) and decreasing in the risk aversion parameter and the variance.
1.2.3 Information signal
Information search realizes a signal S ≥ 0 in t = 1. This signal takes the following form
(compare Peress, 2010):
S = pi +  with  ∼ N(0, 1/s), (5)
where pi is the actual rate of return in t = 2. The error term  reflects that the signal is not
perfect. For mathematical tractability, the error is assumed to be normally distributed.
Its variance depends on the precision of the signal s. It follows that the signal is normally
distributed with S ∼ N(pi, 1/s).4
According to Bayes’ Rule for normally distributed variables, combining the prior µ0
with the signal S results in the posterior µ1 ∼ N(p˜i, σ2) with the following mean and
variance:
p˜i = E[pi|S, µ0] = p · P + s · S
p+ s , (6)
σ2 = V ar[pi|S, µ0] = 1
p+ s. (7)
The signal enters the posterior in two ways. First, a higher signal leads to a higher
expected rate of return. Second, a higher precision of the signal increases the weight of
the signal in determining the posterior expected rate of return and also decreases the
posterior variance.
1.2.4 Behavioral assumptions
In our experiment, we investigate how different visual frames influence investment choices.
We compare a standardized visual frame with a visual frame containing visual distractors.
Visual distractors can have an impact on choices. First, from the psychology literature
we know that visual distractors influence choices if the working memory load is high
(de Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie et al., 2004). Visual distractors automatically draw at-
tention. Shifting attention voluntarily from these features to relevant information costs
4For tractability, the distribution of the signal of the rate of return is not truncated at 0. This does
not influence our theoretical results.
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effort (Itti and Koch, 2001). We call this effect “distracted attention”. Second, we know
from the behavioral finance literature that investors subject to familiarity bias expect a
higher expected rate of return for firms that they are familiar with (Huberman, 2001).
Further, the literature on visual salience shows that individuals are attracted by graphi-
cal representations in financial decisions (de Goeij et al., 2014). Then, visual distractors
related to a firm (e.g., a logo) are assumed to trigger familiarity bias more than if one
simply reads firm names. We call this second mechanism “reinforced familiarity”.
We include these findings by explicitly modelling distracted attention and reinforced
familiarity as parameters in the updating process (equations (6) and (7)). Biases are
modeled to impact choices through updated beliefs (see also Alti and Tetlock, 2014). In
the model, beliefs are influenced by the signal. This signal and its precision follow from
information search. We assume that the perception of the search result, i.e., the signal, is
influenced by distracted attention and reinforced familiarity5. Investors are assumed not
to be aware of the impact of these factors. That is, they cannot deliberately influence
perception, nor can they take the impact of the factors into account during the decision.
In our framework, we model distracted attention as overweighting the precision of the
signal (s). Investors reading information have a high working memory load which makes
them prone to visual distractors (Lavie et al., 2004). We claim that by being distracted,
investors gather less information. In particular, relevant information such as disclaimers
are less likely to be read. For example, KIDs contain a disclaimer stating that the risk
indicator is only based on past development and does not necessarily extrapolate to the
future. Not reading this information leads to overweighting the information content of
the risk indicator. This implies that the precision of the signal is overestimated. In our
model, this is reflected by the weighting parameter ψ of the signal precision s. If ψ > 1,
then the precision is overweighted.
Reinforced familiarity is modelled as biasing the signal S. Investors link their prior
knowledge about the firm to their evaluation of the mutual fund. For example, viewing
information of the firm triggers a positive perception of the particular product. Viewing
a logo triggers this perception more strongly than reading only the name of the firm, i.e.,
it reinforces the familiarity bias. We assume that reinforced familiarity leads investors to
expect the product to have a higher return. Investors are not aware of this overestimation.
We model this overestimation as the weighting parameter θ in the signal S. If θ > 1, then
the signal is biased upwards.6 Then, the signal with reinforced familiarity Sr takes the
following form:
Sr = θpi +  with  ∼ N(0, 1/s), (8)
where the rate of return pi is pre-multiplied by reinforced familiarity parameter θ. If
5In Peress (2010) the precision of the signal is an endogenous choice variable. We take the signal
precision as given. More precisely, we assume that the treatment variation only changes the perception
of the signal.
6We focus on a positive effect of reinforced familiarity. In principle, familiarity can have a negative
effect.
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θ = 1 the signal is unbiased and the formula is identical to (5). Applying Bayes’ rule and
including the distracted attention parameter in equations (6) and (7), we arrive at the
following mean and variance of the posterior:
p˜i = E[pi|S, µ0] = p · P + ψs · Sr
p+ ψs , (9)
σ2 = V ar[pi|S, µ0] = 1
p+ ψs. (10)
Reinforced familiarity distorts the signal and distracted attention leads investors to over-
estimate the precision of the signal. Investors put higher weight on the signal and its
precision than in the unbiased posterior in equations (6) and (7). We can see that the
posterior expected value is increasing in θ through the signal Sr. The posterior variance
is decreasing in ψ. For the posterior expected value, we can also see that both parameters
reinforce each other. That is, the influence of reinforced familiarity on the investment
decision is higher when the signal is over-weighted. Note that the model reduces to the
standard case for θ = 1 and ψ = 1. Beliefs are predicted to impact choices. That is, a
higher weight on the signal increases the weight the distorted signal has on the investment
decision.
1.2.5 Experimental hypotheses
Our model predicts investment behavior through updated beliefs. Reinforced familiarity
and distracted attention parameters differ between familiar (f) and unfamiliar (u) firms
and between the original (O) and neutral (N) treatment. Therefore, expectations and
choices are predicted to differ between treatments.
Concerning the reinforced familiarity parameter, we assume that θf > 1 for familiar
firms and θu = 1 for unfamiliar firms. That means familiarity bias only impacts expec-
tations if firms are known. Familiarity bias is reinforced if firm-specific visual distractors
are present (θO−f > θN−f ). Then, on average, reinforced familiarity leads to more positive
signals over the expected value:
p˜iO−f > p˜iN−f > p˜iN−u = p˜iO−u. (11)
Larger expected values result in higher investments for familiar firms.
Hypothesis 1. If reinforced familiarity is the driving factor, we observe a larger treatment
difference in expected values and investments for familiar firms compared to unfamiliar
firms.
For the distracted attention parameter, we assume ψ = 1 in the neutral treatment and
ψ > 1 in the original treatment. That is, the presence of visual distractors leads to at-
tention distraction in the original treatment. The precision of the signal is overestimated
9
(ψs > s). Thus, the expected variance of the posterior is predicted to be smaller in the
original treatment:
σ2O < σ
2
N . (12)
A lower variance induces higher investments.
Hypothesis 2. If distracted attention is the driving factor, we observe a lower expected
variance and higher investments in the original compared to the neutral treatment.
Distracted attention and reinforced familiarity interact with each other as can be seen from
(9). Distracted attention leads to an overestimation of the signal precision and fosters
overweighting of the signal. Therefore, the effect of reinforced familiarity is increased. If,
on average, the signal is more positive, this leads to a higher expected value (p˜i) for familiar
firms. This impact is even larger if visual distractors are present (e.g., in original). Given
the posterior belief predictions from equations (9) and (10) and the optimal share of the
risky asset in equation (4), we arrive at the following predictions for investment behavior:
X∗O−f > X
∗
N−f > X
∗
N−u, X
∗
O−f > X
∗
O−u > X
∗
N−u. (13)
The predicted invested amount (X∗ = xW ∗0 ) is higher in the original treatment than in
the neutral treatment. Within each treatment, the invested amount is predicted to be
larger for familiar compared to unfamiliar firms.
Hypothesis 3. If both, reinforced familiarity and distracted attention are present, we
observe
(i) lower expected variance in original than in neutral,
(ii) larger treatment difference in expected value for familiar firms,
(iii) higher investments for firms in original compared to neutral and
(iv) larger treatment differences in investment for familiar firms.
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1.3 Experimental design
We investigate the impact of changing the visual frame on expectations and investment
behavior. Our hypotheses are tested in a controlled laboratory experiment resembling
properties of financial decision-making in the field. In our setting, subjects face an invest-
ment problem based on real-life mutual fund investor information documents.
We employ a between-subjects design. Participants are randomly assigned either to
the original or the neutral treatment group. The groups receive different documents
containing the same information. Subjects in the original treatment group are given the
real investor document of a mutual fund. Precisely, we employ KIDs under EU regulation
UCITS IV Directive 2009/65/EC. That is, firm-related visual distractors are present in
original. Participants in the neutral treatment group get the same information. The
only variation is the visual frame of the documents. In neutral, the visual frame is
standardized (see appendix 1.6.3). That is, firm-related visual distractors are removed.
We regard banners, logos, and colors to be firm-related visual distractors. Information in
the documents is constant across both treatment groups. Also, instructions are equivalent
for both groups (see appendix 1.6.5).
Figure 2 presents the experimental setup with two parts: expectation elicitation and
investment choice. First, individuals state their beliefs about the funds’ future return.
Second, they face an investment decision. Both are repeated in four stages. In each stage,
a different fund is considered. We vary the familiarity of the firms across stages. The
order of the stages is randomized individually to control for order effects.
Figure 2: Experimental setup.
Information documents are distributed before each stage. After completion of each stage,
documents are recollected. Note that we elicit the expected value (p˜i), the expected
variance (σ2), and the investment choice (X) from the subjects.
The fund sample consists of mutual funds investing in bonds (see table 3 in appendix
1.6.1). Two funds from familiar firms (DekaBank and Allianz Global Investors) and two
funds from unfamiliar firms (ACM Bernstein and Pioneer Investments) are included in
the sample.7
7Based on the literature, we select funds according to front-end load, annual expenses, return history,
and the risk indicator (1-7), which we consider to be reasonable for an investment with a 4-week horizon.
Additionally, mutual funds containing the term “Euro” in the title as well as funds denominated in euro
are selected to control for the impact of home bias.
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Participants are incentivized in both tasks. They receive their payment four weeks
after the experiment. In order to determine the payment, one stage out of four is cho-
sen randomly for each subject. Then, either the expectation or the investment task is
chosen randomly to be payoff relevant for each individual subject. In this way, hedging
effects between stating beliefs and choices are avoided. Subjects earn points during the
experiment which are exchanged at a rate of 1/800 to euros. Participants face no time
constraints. We track their “reading time” of the information documents for the complete
stage. That is, total reading time includes reading the documents, the expectation, and
the investment task. Participants can leave the laboratory after they have finished the
tasks. This induces the dilemma we observe in the field, namely that individuals may not
want to sacrifice their leisure time to read the documents.
Following the main experiment, participants answer a questionnaire. Questions in-
clude a portfolio allocation task between all funds as well as participants’ demographic
characteristics, income, familiarity with the fund and investment experience as well as
possible background factors impacting the decision, debriefing questions, financial liter-
acy and a cognitive reflection test. Thus, we can control for additional explanatory factors.
Additionally, we also ask multiple choice questions about the content of the documents in
order to get insights into how well the information documents were read. We elicit risk
and ambiguity aversion using multiple choice lists following the approach of Gneezy et al.
(2015).
1.3.1 Part 1: Expectation elicitation
Expectations are elicited as a subjective belief distribution based on a variation of Harri-
son et al. (2013b). A twelve-binned histogram is used. Each interval encompasses a two
percentage range. Subjects distribute 100 tokens on intervals according to their expecta-
tion about the funds’ future return.
The subjective belief distribution is incentivized by a randomized version of the quadratic
scoring rule (Harrison et al., 2013a; Hossain and Okui, 2013);(see also Drerup et al., 2014).
Under this scoring rule, participants have an incentive to truthfully report their subjective
probability distribution. Participants can either earn a fixed payoff of 20 or 0 euros (Hos-
sain and Okui, 2013). Their payoff depends on their stated belief distribution, a random
number and the funds’ net return after four weeks.
In order to determine the payoff from the belief task (wi) for each individual i, a
random number r is drawn independently from U [0, 1]. The corresponding belief payoff
function is described by the following equation:
wi =
20 if
∑12
k=1(bk − 1k)2 ≤ r,
0 else,
(14)
where bk represents the stated number of normalized tokens in each bin k ∈ (0, 1). The
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indicator function 1k equals 1 if the actual net return of the fund lies in bin k and 0
otherwise.
The payoff wi depends on the accuracy of the belief estimate. Accuracy is captured by
ai =
∑12
k=1(bk−1k)2. If ai is small, then accuracy with regard to the actual return is high.
This score ai determines the chance of getting a high payoff independently of the amount
of payment. If the random number r independently drawn from U [0, 1] is larger than
or equal ai, then the participant receives 20 euros and nothing otherwise. Participants
practice this procedure and answer control questions at the start of the experiment.
1.3.2 Part 2: Investment decision
We consider the standard portfolio choice problem in finance (Markowitz, 1952). Individ-
uals choose how much of their endowment they want to invest in a risky fund (Huck et al.,
2014). Participants invest by distributing 12000 points (15 euros) between a safe asset
with a rate of return of 0.1% per year and the fund with an ambiguous rate of return.
The safe asset is framed as a savings account and its rate of return resembles the interest
rate in the market.
1.3.3 Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab on 14 and 15 April 2015. In sum,
N = 182 participants took part in the experiment: n = 87 in the original and n = 95
in the neutral treatment. Participants needed between 55 and 140 minutes to complete
the session. They earned on average 14.20 e. The experiment was programmed using the
experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007a). Participants were recruited from the
BonnEconLab subject pool (more than 6000 subjects) using hroot (Bock et al., 2014).
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Investment behavior
We predict differences in investment behavior and in expectations between treatment
groups. To start, we look at investment behavior. Our experimental hypotheses claim
that individuals invest more in the original treatment than in the neutral treatment
condition. We find supporting evidence.
Result 1. Individuals invest on average more into the fund in the original compared to
the neutral treatment.
Support. Figure 3 displays investment amounts into the fund by treatment pooled across
all four funds. We reject the null hypothesis that investments into funds do not differ
between treatments based on the ranksum test (two-sided, p = 0.0509). Directly testing
our directional hypothesis indicates that individuals invest significantly more in original
(one-sided ranksum, p = 0.0255).
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Figure 3: Investments pooled across funds by treatment (error bars: 95% confidence
intervals).
On average, participants invest 14% more in the fund in the original (6340 points) than in
the neutral (5602 points) disclosure treatment. This overall direction holds across funds.
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Figure 4: Investment differences between treatments by fund.
Figure 4 plots investment differences between treatments for each fund. The lower
point represents mean investment in the neutral treatment, whereas the upper point
plots the mean in the original treatment across individuals. At the individual fund level,
investments differ in the hypothesized direction, i.e., investments are on average lower in
neutral. According to the one-sided ranksum test, mean investments (neutral, original)
are significantly larger in original for ACM (4374, 5396) (p = 0.032), Pioneer (6176,
6898) (p = 0.076) and Allianz GI (6485, 7173) (p = 0.081). The treatment difference for
DekaBank fund (5372, 5894) is not significant (p = 0.196).
DekaBank and Allianz Global Investors are denoted as familiar, ACM Bernstein and
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Pioneer Investments as unfamiliar firms.8 Across both treatments, individuals invest on
average more in familiar firms (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.0038). However, Figure
4 suggests that familiarity does not play a role for the size of the treatment effect. Hy-
pothesis 1 states that treatment differences are larger for familiar firms due to reinforced
familiarity. We do not find evidence supporting this prediction.
In order to reach a better understanding of the investment behavior, we look at the
pooled distribution of investments. Figure 5 shows kernel density estimates by treatment.
The black solid line plots the kernel density estimate of the pooled investments in the
original treatment, whereas the red dashed line shows the corresponding kernel estimate
of pooled investments in the neutral treatment. Assuming continuous distribution of
investment on a metric scale, the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of
distribution functions indicates that the investment distributions differ significantly (p =
0.012).
Most participants invest around half of their endowment into the ambiguous fund. This
corresponds to a 1/n diversification strategy (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001). Compared to
the original kernel estimate, the neutral kernel is narrower in the center and left-shifted.
The kernel estimate of investment in the original treatment condition has larger tails
on the right of the distribution. We find more positive extreme fund investments in the
original treatment.
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Figure 5: Kernel density estimates of investment by treatment. Estimates based on the
Epanechnikov kernel function and Sheather-Jones plugin bandwidth selection criterion.
Determinants of the investment choice are investigated in a multiple linear regression.
Table 1 presents the results. The dependent variable is the individual investment amount
8Answers from subjects in the questionnaire are consistent with this classification. Subjects had to
rate for each firm how well they know it. Subjects knew the familiar firms better than the unfamiliar
firms (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001).
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into the mutual fund for each of the four rounds. In this way, we obtain a panel data
structure with 182 x 4 = 728 observations. The main treatment effect is estimated
by including a dummy variable that indicates 0 if investments are made in the original
treatment condition and 1 if they are made in the neutral treatment. We find a significant
main effect of our treatment on investment under various specifications controlling for a
large number of explanatory factors. This result is in line with our descriptive findings.
Table 1: Random Effects Estimation Results for Investment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment (neutral) -738.7∗ -738.7∗ -872.2∗ -775.6∗ -1086.1∗∗
(420.7) (420.7) (467.1) (461.3) (478.1)
Familiar 525.7∗∗∗ 386.3 335.6 133.3
(202.8) (293.5) (261.0) (358.2)
TreatmentXfamiliar 267.1 215.9 286.1
(406.2) (361.5) (363.3)
Expected value 475.1∗∗∗ 469.9∗∗∗
(39.69) (40.07)
Expected variance -16.87 -20.09
(18.98) (19.36)
Risk aversion 145.3 -70.31
(889.1) (942.6)
Ambiguity aversion -1645.0 -1586.0
(1127.3) (1193.4)
Priors Yes
Rounds Yes
Set of controls + Yes
Constant 6340.3∗∗∗ 6077.4∗∗∗ 6147.2∗∗∗ -41508.8∗∗∗ -39633.1∗∗∗
(303.9) (320.4) (337.5) (4145.2) (5928.3)
Observations 728 728 728 728 728
AdjR2 0.0099 0.0149 0.0152 0.1010 0.210
+ Set of controls includes demographic characteristics, attitude towards financial markets,
firm knowledge, (prospective) fund ownership, reading time, financial literacy, cognitive
reflection, time inconsistency, impression of documents, and macroeconomic environment.
Random effects (GLS) estimation. Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: investment amount (points) into mutual fund.
Familiar is a dummy which takes the value 1 for familiar firms and 0 otherwise.
Significance level: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
All explanatory variables have the expected sign. The neutral treatment is significantly
negatively associated with investment into the fund. Being in the neutral group, partici-
pants invest significantly less in the fund. Expected value is positively significantly related
with investing into the fund. The impact of variance is negative but not significant. In
line with the literature, risk and ambiguity aversion could also explain investment behav-
ior. However, we do not find a significant influence of risk or ambiguity.9 The results
9We elicit the parameters with multiple choice lists and the method used by Gneezy et al. (2015).
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are in line with our hypotheses concerning the overall treatment effect on investments.
The main treatment effect stays significant after including further explanatory variables
into the model. The full model (5) includes in total 32 explanatory factors that could
possibly also influence investment behavior. Results on individual investments are robust
and consistent.
Result 2. Familiarity does not impact the size of the treatment effect on investments.
Support. Estimation results in table 1 suggest that there is no evidence for a signif-
icant interaction effect between familiarity and treatment. The treatment difference in
investments is not significantly higher for familiar firms. This is in line with descriptive
finding from figure 4 that the largest treatment difference in investments is found for an
unfamiliar fund.
1.4.2 Expectations
Subjective expectations are predicted to be a major determinant of investment choices by
our model. We predict that expected return values are larger conditional on familiarity
(hypotheses 1 and 3) and that posterior return variances will be smaller (hypothesis 2)
in the original treatment compared to the neutral treatment. Indeed, we find evidence
that expected return variance is smaller in original.
Result 3. There is an average treatment effect on expected return variance. Individuals
expect a smaller return variance in the original treatment.
Support. Table 2 presents participants’ expectations from the prediction task. Mean
expected return variance across funds is found to be significantly different in the neutral
compared to the original treatment (two-sided, p = 0.036).
Table 2: Subjective expectations: expected value and variance.
Treatment Obs. Mean Mean Probability P-value ranksum test
EV Variance Mass (+) EV Variance Mass (+)
Original 87 102.12 3.75 78.16 0.576 0.036 0.082
Neutral 95 101.97 4.91 74.89
Expected value and variance are derived from the subjective belief distribution
about the return of the funds. Average values are pooled across funds.
Positive probability mass (+) is defined as the probability mass (0 to 100)
in intervals with a positive rate of return.
On average, individuals expect returns to have a smaller variance in original. Then, we
find evidence supporting hypothesis 2. According to hypothesis 3, the expected value
Since we elicited the parameters after the main experiment, this might introduce background risk leading
to increased risk-aversion, confounding our measurement results (see, e.g., Harrison et al., 2007).
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should be higher for familiar firms and even higher when visual distractors are present.
We do not find evidence for the hypothesis on expected value.10
Result 4. There is no average treatment effect on expected values. Also, familiarity does
not play a role for the expected value.
Support. Difference in mean expected values in table 2 is not statistically significant
(two-sided, p = 0.576). We use a random effects regression of the expected value on the
treatment, familiarity, and the interaction term between treatment and familiarity. The
expected value is lower in the neutral treatment (coefficient −0.189, p = 0.567), higher
for familiar firms (coefficient 0.097, p = 0.714), and even higher for familiar firms in the
neutral treatment (coefficient interaction term 0.079, p = 0.831). However, none of these
factors are significant.
As an additional observation we find that subjects in original put on average signif-
icantly more probability mass into the positive domain of the expectation distribution.
That is, individuals expect on average more positive net returns in original. In sum, we
find empirical evidence for our model predictions based on expected variance, but not
based on average expected value.
1.4.3 Mechanism
Based on the analysis of choice and expectation data, we reject hypotheses 1 and 3. We
do not find evidence of the treatment effect being conditional on familiarity. Familiar-
ity provides only a level effect on investment. There is no interaction effect with the
treatment.
We find evidence in line with hypothesis 2. Therefore, distracted attention provides
a potential explanation for our results. Now, we provide additional evidence based on
reading times and comprehension questions supporting this hypothesis.
Result 5. Individuals take more time reading the neutral documents and gather more
correct information from reading it.
Support. Figure 6 presents reading times by round for each treatment. Average reading
times over all rounds are longer in the neutral treatment (6.6 minutes) compared to
the original treatment (5.7 minutes; ranksum test, p = 0.0129). Employing evidence
from post-experimental questions, we find that participants in the neutral treatment
group gather on average significantly more correct information compared to the original
treatment group.
10We calculate the expected value as a joint product of the midpoints of the intervals and its correspond-
ing probability mass. We thereby assume that the open outer intervals end at 89 and 111, respectively.
As a robustness check, the expected value is also calculated using cubic spline interpolation with Hyman
filter leading to the same result (Bellemare et al., 2012).
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Figure 6: Reading times by round (95% confidence intervals)
The red dashed line in Figure 6 corresponds to the neutral treatment and the solid
black line corresponds to the original treatment. Difference between treatments persists
across rounds. Average reading time decreases sharply after the first round and converges
in the following rounds.
Additionally, we asked participants multiple choice questions (one out of four) about
the content and understanding of the documents (after making sure that they were not
keeping any documents on their desks). In particular, we find that participants recognize
the KIDs to be legal documents more often in the neutral treatment (77%) compared to
the original treatment (64%; ranksum, p = 0.065). The risk indicator in the documents
is based on historical data and may be subject to substantial change in the future. This
fact is more often correctly understood in neutral (65%) compared to original (53%;
ranksum, p = 0.090). Further, the nature of past return data is also better understood in
the neutral condition (ranksum, p = 0.066). Past returns are provided annually and are
not predictive for future earnings. In sum, we find that individuals gather more correct
information in the neutral treatment.
This provides additional evidence in favor of the distracted attention hypothesis 2.
Interestingly, subjects perceive the documents as equally informative in original (4.05 on
a 6-point Likert scale) as in neutral (4.15, ranksum, p = 0.618) suggesting that they are
not aware of being distracted. Multiple choice questions were asked after subjects read
four different documents. Each of these documents contained all the relevant information
to answer all questions correctly. Then, the treatment effect is found to be persistent and
does not vanish due to learning. In combination with the decreasing reading times, this
suggests that subjects focus only on specific parts of the documents and keep this pattern
constant across trials. That is, subjects do not improve by experience.
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1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we study whether changing the visual frame of disclosure documents in-
fluences expectations and investment behavior. We used a laboratory experiment to
examine the causal effect from changing the documents by controlling the information
setting. The visual frame in the document is varied by removing visual distractors. We
find that subjects in the original treatment invest more in the mutual funds. Individuals
expect returns of the funds to be less risky in the original treatment (visual distractors
being present) compared to the neutral treatment, but do not expect a lower rate of
return (Shefrin, 2001).
Our results are in line with the distracted attention mechanism. Reading times and
questionnaire data provide additional evidence for the distracted attention hypothesis.
Participants take more time to read documents and comprehend them better if confronted
with a standardized visual frame without visual distractors. Further, individuals in the
neutral treatment put on average less probability mass in the positive domain of the
expectation distribution. Subjects in neutral are more likely to read information, which
makes them more cautious in their decision. Being more cautious, negative outcomes are
more often considered in neutral, leading to a larger expected return variance in neutral.
The results provide limited empirical support for our theoretical framework. Although
we find higher investments and a lower expected variance in the estimates of the indi-
viduals in the original treatment, we do not find a significant relation between expected
variance and investment. Also, familiarity does not affect the treatment difference.
An alternative explanation for our results could be perceived trustworthiness of the
documents. That is, the documents featuring firm logo and layout in the original treat-
ment could, in principle, signal more trustworthiness compared to the documents in the
neutral treatment. Participants would invest because they have the impression that the
original document is more reliable than the neutral one. However, we find from ques-
tionnaire data that impressions of the documents do not differ between treatments. Both
treatment documents are found to be equally reliable (ranksum, p = 0.403) and credible
(ranksum, p = 0.670). Moreover, brand perception as a decision factor does not differ
significantly between treatments (ranksum, p = 0.144).
From the actual development of the funds (see table 4 in appendix 1.6.1), we can see
that actual returns are volatile and lie below participants’ expectations. In our four-week
investment horizon, net returns decrease up to −5.53%. Participants are paid according
to net returns (including fees and expenses) in expectation and choice tasks. Net return
is negative for all funds. That is, in our experiment, and given the specific development
of the funds, investors would have ex post optimally invested their whole endowment in
the safe asset.
KID documents were introduced in order to help retail investors make better-informed
decisions. Our results show that in reaching this goal the visual frame is not innocent.
Indeed, we find evidence that limited attention negatively affects efficacy of mandatory
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disclosure policies as suggested by Loewenstein et al. (2014). Investors are distracted,
which leads them to gather less correct information. Importantly, information search
experience does not improve the situation. On the contrary, individuals seem to miss the
same important information over and over again, leading to a constant overvaluation of
the fund. If policy makers aim at information disclosures which inform investors best,
then they have to go beyond information. Removing visual distractors, by standardizing
the visual frame, can help to improve disclosure efficacy.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Tables
Table 3: Fund characteristics.
Mutual fund Asset Average return Front-end Back-end Annual Risk
(ISIN) category (2012-2014) load load expense (1-7)
DekaBank EuroFlex Plus ABS 9.2% 1.5% 0% 0.46% 3
(LU0192794724)
Allianz GI Euro Bond Fund Bonds 9.9% 2.0% 0% 0.82% 3
(LU0212861099)
ACM Euro High Yield Bonds 14.8% 1.5% 0% 0.94% 4
(LU0119429891)
Pioneer Fund Euro Bond Bonds 7.6% 1.0% 0% 1.96% 3
(LU0496389064)
Notes: Average return is calculated for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014.
Table 4: Actual fund development.
DekaBank Allianz GI ACM Pioneer
Return 0.08% -3.57% 1.10% -2.81%
Net return (incl. fees) -1.44% -5.53% -0.48% -3.93%
Notes: The relevant investment horizon in our experiment is between
14 April 2015 and 12 May 2015 and 15 April and 13 May 2015, respectively.
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1.6.2 Questionnaire
Factors original neutral Total rank-sum p
Document quality 3.4 (4) 3.67 (3) 3.54 (3) .2943
Brand 2.67 (5) 2.39 (5) 2.52 (5) .1441
Experience with firm 1.97 (6) 2.13 (6) 2.05 (6) .7674
Cost 3.41 (3) 3.56 (4) 3.49 (4) .4873
Historical data 5 (1) 5.13 (1) 5.07 (1) .3158
Risk indicator 4.82 (2) 4.86 (2) 4.84 (2) .8777
Background Risk
Greek debt crisis 3.38 3.16 3.26 .3275
EZB monetary policy 3.43 3.08 3.25 .1018
DAX development 3.05 3.05 3.05 .9519
Table 5: Factors important for decision. Answers on a 6-point likert scale ranging from
‘not important at all’ to ‘very important’. Cardinal rank in parentheses. Ranksum shows
p-value of a Mann-Whitney ranksum test.
original neutral Total rank-sum p
Would you change your decision if ad-
vised by a professional?
5.41 5.37 5.39 .7838
Information was sufficient to make an
investment decision.
2.98 2.89 2.93 .9862
I did not understand the information. 2.87 2.81 2.84 .9655
How competent do you think you are
in making investment decisions?
2.74 2.32 2.52 .0567
How sure are you that you made the
right investment decision?
3.03 2.62 2.82 .0615
Table 6: General debriefing questions. Answers on a 7-point likert scale.
original neutral Total rank-sum p
Useful 4.03 3.85 3.94 .242
Informative 4.05 4.15 4.1 .6184
Reliable 4.43 4.31 4.36 .4033
Credible 4.22 4.18 4.2 .6697
Table 7: Impression of the information sheets. Answers on a 6- point likert scale ranging
from ‘do not agree’ to ‘do fully agree’.
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original neutral Total rank-sum p χ2
Legal document 64% 77% 71% .065 .064
Risk indicator not reliable indica-
tion for future development
53% 65% 59% .0901 .089
Total loss possible 47% 55% 51% .3062 .305
Past development does not con-
tain front-end load
43% 35% 38% .2818 .280
Past development not reliable in-
dication for future development
80% 81% 81% .9195 .919
Liability-relevant 38% 34% 36% .5514 0.550
Past development contains yearly
data
92% 98% 95% .0656 .065
Table 8: Correct answers to questions about the information document in percent.
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1.6.4 Screens
Figure 15: Screen: belief stage.
Figure 16: Screen: investment stage.
1.6.5 Instructions
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Instructions (translated from German) 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
You are going to take part in an economic study. This study is part of a project financed by the Max Planck                                           
society. If you read the following explanations carefully, you will be able to earn a substantial sum of money.                                     
It is therefore crucial that you read these explanations carefully. During the experiment it is prohibited to use                                   
electronic devices. Please use only the experimental program on the computer. During the experiment there                             
shall be absolutely no communication between participants. If you have any questions, please raise your                             
hand. We will then come over to you. Any violation of these rules means you will be excluded from the                                       
experiment and from any payments.  
For participating in the experiment you receive a show­up fee of 5 euros. Additionally, you will be able to                                     
earn additional money. Your payment depends on your decisions, the future development of an investment                             
and on chance. Instructions are identical for all participants. The procedure and the payment details are                               
described below. 
 
Procedure 
 
● Practicing period 
● 4 rounds with two tasks each 
● Questionnaire 
● 1. payment: directly after the experiment 
● 2. payment: via bank transfer at the 18th of may 2015 
 
Before the experiment starts you will have the opportunity to practice and to get used to the decision                                   
environment. 
 
The experiment consists of 4 rounds. Each round consists of two tasks: an estimation task and an                                 
investment task. In the end ​one ​out of two tasks in ​one ​round will be chosen randomly and is then relevant                                         
for your payment. Since you do not know which task is going to be chosen for payment, you should decide                                       
carefully. Payment consists of two parts. The second part of the payment will be paid 4 weeks after the                                     
experiment. 
 
During the experiment we will not calculate in euro, but instead in points. The total number of points you 
earn in the course of the experiment will be transferred into euro at the end, at a rate of 
 
800 Punkte = 1 €. 
 
Following the tasks, we ask you to answer a questionnaire. Please also answer these questions carefully. 
After you have finished the experiment, you receive your payment for today and leave the laboratory. 
 
 
 
Task 1 
 
In the first task, we ask you to predict the value of an investment into a fund in four weeks. You are dealing                                             
with real­world funds in this experiment. Your prediction will be compared to the actual development of the                                 
fund investment. Your payment depends on your performance at this prediction. 
 
We calculate your payment four weeks after you have made your prediction. Precisely, we calculate how                               
much an investor would actually get back from a 100 euro investment into the fund. Such an investor takes                                     
costs and expenses on a monthly level into account. We assume that you invest today                             
14/04/2015(15/04/2015) at 5:59pm in shares of the fund. We further assume that shares are sold on                               
Wednesday 13/05/2015 (Tuesday 12/04/2015) at 5:59pm. Your prediction is compared to the actual value                           
from selling this investment. 
  
 
What is a fund? 
A fund is a way of investing money. An investment company collects money of investors, pools it and                                   
invests it in one or more areas of investment. Shares may be traded each trading day. Money is invested                                     
according to certain investment guidelines, e.g. in stocks, bonds, in the money market or in real estate.                                 
Usually funds need to spread risks when investing. That is, a fund cannot invest everything in one stock                                   
or one real estate property. 
 
The selection of funds in this experiment is no recommendation for investments outside this experiment.                             
This research is not financed by these fund companies. Fund companies do not get data from this study. 
 
You will get the opportunity to read information about the funds. This is actual information from the                                 
real­world fund. The two­page information will be distributed before each round. You can choose between                             
different intervals in your prediction. Specifically, you can distribute 100 tokens between up to 12 intervals.                               
You determine the number of tokens by switching the slider with the cursor. Tokens are displayed as bars.                                   
Please consider the following example. The picture below shows the decision screen of the computer. 
 
Decision screen 
 
 
 
 
Assume you are investing 100 euros today into the fund. Please answer the following question: 
 
What will be the value of your investment after 4 weeks?  
 
In other words, please predict the likelihood that the actual value of your investment will be in the interval.                                     
Inflation can be disregarded. Assume for instance, that your are completely sure that the future value from                                 
the investment will lie in the interval between 102 and 104 euros. Then, you would answer the question                                   
above by distributing 100 tokens in the interval “102­104”. If you would think it is equally likely that the future                                       
value will lie between 102 and 104 or between 104 and 106 euros, then you would distribute, as in the                                       
example above, 50 tokens in the interval “102­104” and 50 tokens in the interval “104­106”. 
 
In the following, we explain precisely the calculation of your payment. 
First, we scale the number of tokens to 1, i.e. we divide them by 100. That is, 30 tokens correspond to                                         
30/100 = 0,3; 40 tokens correspond to 40/100 = 0,4 and so on. Second, we determine the interval which                                     
contains the actual value. We call this the target interval. Third, we calculate your payment based on three                                   
parts: 
 
● The deviation of your estimate from the actual value is calculated as follows: 
(tokens in target interval  ­ 1)​2 
+  (tokens in 1st interval outside the target interval)​2  
+  (tokens in 2nd interval outside the target interval)​2 
+ ...  
+  (tokens in 11th interval outside the target interval)​2 
 
● A random number between 0 and 1 is drawn.  
● If your deviation is smaller or equal to the random number, then you receive 16.000 points. If your                                   
deviation is larger than the random number, then you receive 0 points. The smaller your deviation,                               
the larger is your chance to receive 16.000 points. 
 
Please consider the following 3 examples to illustrate how your payment is calculated. 
 
Assume for instance, that your think it is likely that the future value will lie between 102 and 104 euros.                                       
Further, you think it is less likely that the future value will lie between 104 and 106 euros. You think it is even                                             
less likely that the future value will lie between 106 and 108 euros. Then, you distribute 60 tokens in the                                       
interval „102­104“, 30 tokens in the interval „104­106“, 10 tokens in the interval „106­108“ and 0 tokens in                                   
the remaining intervals.  
 
1. Example: If the actual value after 4 weeks is 103 euros, then your deviation is calculated as follows 
​(0,6 ­ 1)​2​ + (0,3​2 ​+ 0,1​2 ​) = 0,26. 
 
The deviation is 0,26. The payment is:  
If 0,26   random number between 0 and 1, then you receive   16.000 points.≤   
If 0,26 >  random number between 0 and 1, then you receive           0 points. 
 
 
 
2. Example: If the actual value after 4 weeks is 105 euros, then your deviation is calculated as follows 
(0,3 ­ 1)​2​ + (0,6​2 ​+ 0,1​2 ​) = 0,86. 
 
The deviation is 0,86. The payment is:  
If  0,86    random number between 0 and 1, then you receive   16.000 points.≤   
If  0,86 >   random number between 0 and 1, then you receive           0 points. 
 
 
 
Next, assume you are distributing 12 tokens on the interval „102­104“ and equal amount of tokens (8 tokens)                                   
on each other interval.  
 
3. Example: If the actual value after 4 weeks is 103 euros, then your deviation is calculated as follows 
(0,12 ­ 1)​2​ + (0,08​2​+ 0,08​2 ​+ 0,08​2 ​+ 0,08​2​+ 0,08​2​ +0,08​2​ +0,08​2​ +0,08​2​ +0,08​2​ +0,08​2​ +0,08​2​) = 0,93.  
 
The deviation is 0,93. The payment is:  
If 0,93    random number between 0 and 1, then you receive   16.000 points.≤   
If 0,93 >   random number between 0 and 1, then you receive           0 points. 
 
Attention​: The numbers of tokens and expressions such as “likely” or “very likely” in the above examples                                 
have been chosen arbitrarily. They are no guidance for your decisions in the experiment. The examples                               
indicate that your chance to earn 16.000 points increases with the precision of your estimate. 
 
You may ask yourself why we selected such a calculation rule as above. The reason is, that under such a                                       
calculation rule, your expected payment is highest if you distribute tokens according to your true belief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 2 
 
In the second task, we ask you to make an investment decision. You are endowed with 12.000 points. You                                     
have the opportunity to invest in the following investments: 
 
● into the fund 
● into a savings account with interest rate of 0,1% per year 
 
Please answer the following question: How many of the 12.000 points are you investing into the funds and                                   
how many in the savings account? Please decide by switching the slider below the two options. We                                 
calculate your payment based on the actual value of your investments after 4 weeks. 
 
That is, we calculate how much an investor would actually get back from a 100 euro investment into the                                     
investments. Such an investor takes costs and expenses on a monthly level into account. We assume that                                 
you invest today 14/04/2015 (15/04/2015) at 5:59pm in shares of the fund. We further assume that shares                                 
are sold on Wednesday 12/05/2015 (13/05/2015) at 5:59pm.   
Payment 
 
Your payment consist of 2 parts. Today, you receive the first part right after the experiment. You will receive                                     
the second part after 4 weeks. After the experiment, one out of four rounds is randomly selected for you by                                       
the computer. Then, one out of two tasks is randomly selected for you. This task is relevant for your                                     
payment in 4 weeks. 
 
You will receive your payment either by bank transfer or cash. Please choose one of the payment options. 
 
If you choose bank transfer, then you may type your IBAN in the corresponding field on the screen after the                                       
experiment has started. Make sure you have your IBAN with you. Your payment details are treated as                                 
confidential. We only use them to make sure you will receive your payment. Of course, data and publication                                   
of results are anonymized. 
 
If you choose the cash payment, then we would ask you to type the six­digit code at your place into the                                         
screen once the experiment is started. Payment is only possible based on this code. Therefore, you should                                 
store it safely. Payment will take place on Monday 18/05/2015 (2:00­4:00 pm) at the Max Planck Institute for                                   
Research on Collective Goods (Kurt­Schumacher­Str. 10, 53113 Bonn).  
 
 
Do you have any questions? Please answer the control questions. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in the experiment! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control questions 
 
 
1. What are the parts of the total payment? 
 
_____   
 
 
2. How many rounds and tasks are randomly selected for payment? 
 
_____   
 
       3.  Assume you distribute 100 tokens in task 1 to the interval  „102­104“ and 0 tokens to the others.  
 
a. How is the payment calculated in task 1, if the actual value after 4 weeks is 103 and the                                     
random number is 0,7?  
_____  
 
 
b. How is the payment calculated in task 1, if the actual value after 4 weeks is 107 and the                                     
random number is 0,7?  
_____ 
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2 Gain-Loss Framing in Interdependent Choice
2.1 Introduction
Choices are influenced by framing. Casual observations as well as numerous studies are
in line with that statement. Framing is also a powerful tool which is regularly and inten-
tionally used in political speeches, advertisement and health care or donation campaigns.
Changing the perceived context of a situation, simple relabeling of decisions or the de-
scription of outcomes is shown to have a huge impact on human decision makers.
The frame which is studied most prominently in economics is the gain-loss frame.
People react differently to situations framed as a loss compared to situations framed as
gains. This effect has been introduced to the economic literature in the seminal study by
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) when comparing choices over lives lost compared to lives
saved. Further examples are demonstrated by the fact that people are more risk-loving
when facing losses compared to facing gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1991) and the endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1990) with loss-aversion
and reference-dependent preferences as the main driving factor (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979).
Importantly, being prone to framing effects does not only have consequences for in-
dependent decisions. Often decision maker’s choices directly or indirectly impact the
well-being of others. Evidence shows that even when decision makers take the outcome
for others into account, the extent to which they do so is influenced by framing (e.g.,
Brekke et al., 2012; Dariel, 2013; Engel and Rand, 2014). This effect might be driven by
different mental representations of the situation and with that the understanding of “what
is the right thing to do”. Alternatively, decision makers facing losses could be occupied
with themselves while decision makers facing gains could have more cognitive resources
at their disposal to take others’ welfare into account.
Testing the framing effect in the context of interdependent choice, this paper inves-
tigates these processes by analyzing the information search and integration processes in
binary modified dictator games.
For economic theory framing poses a fundamental challenge. When choices are not
consistent but influenced by framing, the common revealed preference attempt is poten-
tially misleading. This makes predictions challenging. Specifically, a decision maker’s
behavior as observed in one frame does not necessarily translate into similar behavior in a
different frame. In behavioral economics, frames are mainly understood and modeled as a
variation in the reference point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Amos Tversky, 1986) and
as a factor influencing beliefs (Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012). A general
framework is given by Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and Bernheim and Rangel (2007).
They, among others, suggest that economic models should take “ancillary conditions”
like frames into account to allow for welfare analysis encompassing non-standard decision
makers.
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Salant and Rubinstein (2008) describe a frame as “[...] observable information, other
than the set of feasible alternatives, which is irrelevant in the rational assessment of
the alternatives but nonetheless affects behavior”. The effects of framing on choice and
judgment behavior have been demonstrated in individual and interdependent decision
situations various times, but exactly how framing affects behavior, i.e., how the mental
representation of a situation changes, still remains unclear. So far, economists mainly
focus on outcome-based models with choice as the main observational variable. It is rec-
ognized that in order to understand decision making and its influential factors completely,
this might not be enough (e.g., Krajbich et al., 2014; Krajbich and Dean, 2015). When
the aim is to develop a theory of economic decision making capable of predicting choices
also in different, previously unobserved frames, a clear understanding of the underlying
cognitive mechanism, i.e., the decision making process is important.
In order to study these questions, we conducted a lab experiment. Subjects play
multiple modified-dictator games (Andreoni and Miller, 2002) where they decide between
an own-outcome maximizing (selfish) option and an other-outcome maximizing (altruistic)
option. In a between-subjects design, decisions are either framed as a gain (gain) or as
a loss (loss). We use eye-tracking to record visual fixations of subjects.
We use eye-tracking as a source of complementary data to gain insights into the un-
derlying mechanisms of choices. In particular, eye-fixations as an unobtrusive measure
can provide important information about the weight (or importance) given to the dif-
ferent types of information (e.g., own outcome, recipient’s outcome) during the decision
making process (see, e.g., Armel et al., 2008; Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel,
2011). Eye-tracking is unobtrusive in that we can gain insights into the motives of de-
cision makers without actively changing the decision environment which in itself could
influence decision making. Various studies utilize eye-tracking in the context of economic
decision making. These papers shed light on fairness motivations (Arieli et al., 2009),
decisions under uncertainty (Arieli et al., 2011), truth-telling (Wang et al., 2010), as well
as behavior in social dilemmas (Fiedler et al., 2013), consumer choice (Reutskaja et al.,
2011) and strategic interaction (Devetag et al., 2015; Polonio et al., 2015).
In recent years the interest in understanding the underlying mechanisms behind choices
is rapidly increasing (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011; Fehr and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al.,
2010, 2014). With the advancements in neuroeconomics and cognitive psychology, new
tools and a better understanding of how to interpret process data such as eye-movements
and decision times are available. Studying framing effects is particularly helpful. Framing
produces comparable situations which are identical from an outcome perspective. This
way, every change in behavior must be a result of a different perception of the situa-
tion, i.e., a change on the process level because all other environmental features are kept
constant (Levin et al., 2014).
The results of the study at hand provide evidence for a clear framing effect. Dictators
facing gains choose the altruistic option more often (55%) than subjects facing losses (38%)
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in situations where the dictator has a higher income than the recipient. This difference
between frames is not found in situations in which the dictator has a lower income than
the recipient. Specifically interesting in light of these choice patterns is the respective
change in the observed attention distribution. We find a strong difference between frames
concerning subject’s information search behavior. Subjects in loss focus more on their
own income compared to subjects in gain.
In order to structure our results we use a behavioral model, namely Reference Depen-
dent Altruism (Breitmoser and Tan, 2014) and interpret it as a process model. We show
that the model and altruism parameters elicited in an online pre-test fit the choice data
and process data quite well. The altruism parameters strongly correlate with relative
attentional weighting of selfish and other-regarding information.
The main aim of the paper is to improve the understanding of framing effects in
interdependent situations. With this paper we provide a first step towards a better un-
derstanding of how exactly frames influence decision making. Our results suggests that,
when facing losses, subjects put more weight on losses to their own outcome compared
to losses of the other subjects. In other words, loss aversion seems to be stronger in the
own-outcome domain compared to the other-outcome domain.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss further litera-
ture. We develop theoretical predictions for our study in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes
the experimental setup. In Section 2.5 we present the results and discuss them in Section
2.6.
2.2 Further Literature
2.2.1 Gain-loss framing in interdependent situations
In line with our results multiple experiments have presented evidence showing that peo-
ple’s response when confronted with gains versus losses varies profoundly. Already the
influential work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that losses have a bigger influ-
ence than gains of the same size (see for a more recent overview Baumeister et al., 2001).
This effect has been observed in a wide range of situations and contexts alike, but mainly
in the area of risky decision making (Kühberger, 1998). See Camerer and Loewenstein
(2004) for an overview of loss aversion in the field, but see Novemsky and Kahneman
(2005) for the boundaries of loss aversion.
With respect to interdependent social decisions the literature shows mixed results. In
Antinyan (2014), subjects play a dictator game in which the dictator and the recipient
experience a loss before making a decision. They do not find significant differences in
average allocation behavior between loss and gain decisions but in the loss treatment
more equal offers are observed. Buchan et al. (2005) use a ultimatum game in which
decisions are made about sharing a loss and sharing a gain. They find that offers are
higher when facing losses than when facings gains. Fitting to this result Zhou and Wu
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(2011) find in a similar setting that non-fair offers were perceived less fair in the loss
domain and got rejected more often compared to the gain domain (but see Leliveld et al.,
2009). In contrast to these results, further studies show that individuals in a loss condition
are more own-outcome oriented (De Dreu et al., 1994; De Dreu, 1996) more individualistic
(Poppe and Valkenberg, 2003) and more prone to unethical behavior (Kern and Chugh,
2009) than individuals in the gain condition. Of these papers the experimental design in
Poppe and Valkenberg (2003) is most similar to ours. They map decisions of subjects to
social value orientations, while we focus on the overall share of altruistic decision and on
explaining effects on choices with the help of eye-gaze data.
2.2.2 Process investigations on gains and losses
Process investigations of framing effects are rare in the literature and almost exclusively
concern individual decision making without any consequences for others. Further, most
of these studies focus on response times.
In early studies Liebrand and McClintock (1988) and Dehue et al. (1993) present evi-
dence from decision time investigations of simple allocation tasks that cooperative decision
makers need more time to decide about losses in comparison to gains. In general, this is
understood as a consequence of loss-aversion and consequently a higher weighting of losses
compared to gains. Yechiam and Hochman (2013a) suggest an alternative explanation:
losses invoke an “attentional effect leading to increased sensitivity to task incentives”
(Yechiam and Hochman, 2013a,b). Another paper dealing with the attentional effect is
by Baumeister et al. (2001). They argue that bad events (e.g., losses) should capture
more attention compared to good events (e.g., gains). Alternatively, this might be due to
a negative mood raised by a negative frame inducing an increase in cognitive effort in the
domain of losses (Kuo et al., 2009). More broadly, many studies showed that losses have
a stronger effect on physiological arousal (e.g., heart rate and pupil dilations) compared
to gains (Satterthwaite et al., 2007; Hochman et al., 2010; Hochman and Yechiam, 2011).
In contrast to these studies, we do not find a direct effect of the framing manipu-
lation on decision times. Further, we mainly focus on the relative attention to specific
information.
2.2.3 Assumptions about the relationship between gaze behavior and the
cognitive process
Through technological progress in the area of gaze recordings we have the possibility to
gain insights in previously unobservable cognitive processes involved in decision making.
Thereby, understanding the connection between the observable single fixation and the
respective unobservable processing of the attended information is of utterly importance.
Evidence from the area of language processing and problem solving shows that the location
and the duration of a fixation is strongly related in the sense that “the most active location
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in working memory will eventually determine the most likely direction of the eye movement
at a given point in time” (Huettig et al., 2011). Various experimental studies have shown
that people tend to direct their attention at what they are currently talking and thinking
about (e.g., Griffin and Bock, 2000; Renkewitz and Jahn, 2012). Additional support for
this assumption is given by the result that the sensitivity to stimuli is greater when the
stimuli are presented at a location to which attention has been allocated (e.g., Bashinski
and Bacharach, 1980; Reynolds et al., 2000). The recent formulation of the Attentional
Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al., 2010) in the area of computational neuroscience
researchers become even more concrete and claim that the proportion of attention to a
particular option is strongly predictive for subsequent choice behavior (see also work by
Shimojo et al., 2003).
Not only attention towards alternatives in general, but also towards specific attributes
of an alternative has been shown to be predicted by the importance and weighting of a
specific piece of information in the decision making process (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2013;
Reisen et al., 2008).
Building on this assumption we will use eye-tracking to investigate the relative weight-
ing and importance of attributes in the decision making process. Additionally we will
provide insights in how this weighting changes through different frames.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
2.3.1 Setup
Our aim is to understand framing effects in social interactions. We focus on binary choice
without uncertainty and without strategic interaction. Specifically, we look at a modified
dictator game setting (Andreoni and Miller, 2002) in which subjects choose between two
distributions of money between themselves and another anonymous participant. One
option will be called the “selfish” option and the other the “altruistic” option.
Let the “selfish” option be denoted as (si, sj), where si determines the own outcome
and s2 the outcome of the other player. Then, the “altruistic” option is given by (ai, aj) =
(si− c, sj + b), where ai is the own outcome and aj is the other player’s outcome. We set
c > 0 and b > c, such that the altruistic option will always be socially efficient. Further,
we vary two types of situations. Either, subjects are ahead of their partner in both options
(ai > aj and si > sj) or they are behind regarding the outcomes (ai < aj and si < sj).
We introduce a framing manipulation by presenting the same allocation either as a
gain (gain) or as a loss (loss). Let eG be the endowment in gain and eL the endowment
in loss (with eL > eG). Then, the two options can be described in terms of gains (g) and
losses (l). Specifically, the selfish option (si, sj) can be expressed as (si = eG + gi, sj =
eG + gj) in gain and as (si = eL − li, sj = eL − lj) in loss. The altruistic option is
defined accordingly. Importantly, both framing manipulations are identical from a payoff
perspective.
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2.3.2 Reference Dependent Altruism
In this section we discuss requirements on the theory. We are interested in models dealing
with context effects and with gain-loss framing in particular. We are interested in a
theory which gives us a unified account for different context effects. Specifically, we look
for a theory which endogenously predicts whether subjects choose the altruistic, efficient
option or whether they choose the selfish option. Further, we are interested in predictions
regarding process data. In particular, we want to predict relative attention to certain
information and decision times.
Note that we are not interested in comparing and testing different theories of fairness
even though eye-tracking might be a powerful tool to do this. Rather, we are interested
in whether framing influences attentional processes. For this we employ a parsimonious
model which is easily applicable.
There is little evidence on what to expect in regard of a shift in attentional processes.
To the best of our knowledge there is no single model that could predict choices, decision
time, and relative proportion of fixations at the same time. Our approach is to use a
behavioral model, interpret it as a process model and use it to make predictions about
the choice and information search behavior.
We assume that attention is guided by the importance of certain attributes of the
situation to the decision maker. Therefore, the model needs to predict the relative weight
of the attributes that guide the choice. To simplify, we reduce them for now to two simple
attributes: own payoff and recipient payoff. Accordingly, for our setting the model would
need to feature weights for the own income in relation to the other player’s income. We
focus on one specific theory, namely Reference Dependent Altruism (RDA, Breitmoser
and Tan, 2013, 2014) which fits our requirements.
The basic idea of RDA is that agents are more altruistic when their income is above a
certain reference point. The authors focus on two types of reference points: The absolute
reference point is determined by an endowment or by the ex-ante expected payoff (x∗i ).
The relative reference point is determined by another agent’s payoff (xj).
RDA suggests a strong difference in behavior when their income is higher than that
of the other subject, i.e. they are ahead of the other subject in terms of payoff compared
to being behind. Subjects should be more altruistic when they are ahead. Also, when
subjects are above their absolute reference point, e.g., by experiencing a gain, they are
assumed to be more altruistic compared to when facing losses. For our purposes we induce
gains and losses through the endowment and assume that the endowment determines the
absolute reference point. The decision maker’s income in gain (loss) is therefore always
above (below) the absolute reference point11
In our setup subjects always face a relative reference point (the other player’s payoff
xj) and an absolute reference point x∗ at the same time. The combination of the frame
11Our predictions hold as long as we assume that the absolute reference point in loss is higher than
in gain (compare Grolleau et al., 2014).
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(gain, loss) and relative payoffs (ahead, behind) leads to four situations (GAIN-ahead,
GAIN-behind, LOSS-ahead, LOSS-behind). We obtain the following utility function Ui =
xi + αi(F,R)xj where αi now depends on the absolute reference point determined by
frame F (with F ∈ {GAIN,LOSS}) and on the relative reference point R (with R ∈
{ahead, behind}). Further, subjects are (potentially) heterogeneous in their parameters.
Following RDA, we assume α(·, ahead) > α(·, behind) and α(GAIN, ·) > α(LOSS, ·),
i.e. the altruism parameter is higher when subjects’ income is above their relative reference
point (independent of the frame) and higher when subjects’ income is above their absolute
reference point (independent of the relative comparison). Consequently, an individual
acting according to this model could be characterized by four altruism parameters, one
for every situation.12 In order to compare the model predictions with individual behavior,
we elicit these parameters for every subject in a pre-test (see Appendix 2.7.2).
2.3.3 Choice predictions
Given a choice between the selfish option S = (si, sj) and the altruistic option A =
(ai, aj) = (si − c, sj + b) and a situation-dependent altruism parameter α, a subject
chooses the altruistic option (here option A) whenever:
Ui(A) = s1 − c+ αi(s2 + b) > Ui(S) = s1 + αis2
⇔ α > c
b
Therefore, in the model, the choice is determined only by the cost-benefit factor (the
fraction c/b) of the specific decision and the altruism parameter. In the experiment
the cost-benefit factor varies between options. Given the assumptions over the altruism
parameters the following two hypotheses follow directly.
HC1: Overall, subjects are more likely to choose the altruistic option in gain com-
pared to loss. On an individual level, the choice is determined by the parameters collected
in the online pre-test.
HC2: Subjects are more likely to choose the altruistic option when being ahead com-
pared to being behind. On an individual level, the choice is determined by the parameters
collected in the online pre-test.
2.3.4 Predictions about attentional process
In this section we derive predictions about the attentional process. In particular, we make
prediction about the relative proportion of attention to own and other-regarding informa-
12Note that we make no assumptions about the interaction of absolute and relative reference points.
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tion as well as the extent of information search, i.e. the decision time. We interpret the
RDA model as a process model. For this, we adapt the basic assumption that subjects fix-
ate more on information which is more important for their decision. We then interpret the
altruism parameter as a measure of relative importance of other-regarding information in
comparison to self-regarding information. This provides us with the following hypothesis.
HA1: Information search behavior differs in terms of relative fixations to own and
other income between treatments. Subjects in loss focus more on their own income com-
pared to subjects in gain. On an individual level the relative proportion to the own
outcome correlates negatively with the altruism parameter collected in the online pre-test.
HA2: Information search behavior differs in terms of relative fixations to own and
other income between situations where subjects are ahead and where they are behind in
their payoffs. On an individual level the relative proportion to the own outcome correlates
negatively with the altruism parameter collected in the online pre-test.
In order to get insights into whether framing makes a computational difference, we look
at a measure for the depth of information, in particular the overall number of fixations and
decision time. Following up on our process interpretation of the RDA model and the above
assumptions we do not expect an influence of the frame and the relative income on the
decision time. More precisely, our adapted RDA model only allows us to make predictions
about the relative importance of information and not about a general difference between
loss and gain decisions.
HA3: The absolute number of fixations and decision time does not vary between frames
and relative income situations.
2.4 Experimental Design
2.4.1 Laboratory setup
Subjects in the experiment played multiple binary modified dictator games. In total, they
faced 40 different decision tasks. For each of these decisions, subjects had to choose be-
tween a selfish option and an altruistic option. All options, however, gave both the decision
maker and the receiver positive payoffs. The options were designed such that the altruis-
tic option was additionally the socially efficient option, maximizing total payoffs.Subjects
choosing the altruistic option had to forgo payoffs when choosing the altruistic option
compared to the selfish option.
Framing was induced by describing each option pair either as a gain (gain treatment)
or a loss (loss treatment). Subjects took part in only one treatment in a between-subjects
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design. To accomplish identical final payoffs in both treatments subjects received an
endowment of 0.25 e in gain and 9 e in loss. The endowment was made particularly
salient by handing out the endowments before subjects started their task.13 Additionally,
in half of the decisions subjects earned more than their counterpart (irrespective of their
choice) whereas in the other half of the decisions subjects earned less. We denote these
decisions as ahead and behind, respectively.
Each subject faced the same items. The specific items were generated randomly within
a given set of parameters. Specifically, the cost-benefit ratio of the generated mini dictator
games was uniformly distributed between 0.1 and 0.9.14 Also, the screen position (left
vs. right) of the altruistic and selfish options were counterbalanced. The specific set of
items used for this study can be found in Appendix 2.7.1. To control for order effects we
varied the order in which the items appeared randomly for each subject. Subjects received
detailed instructions and answered control questions about the nature of the game before
they started (find the full set of instructions in appendix). Subjects were informed that
one randomly selected item would be played out and become payoff relevant for themselves
and their matched counterpart.15
Additionally, subjects took part in an incentivized online pre-test (at least 24 hours
before the experiment) where we elicited their altruism parameters for the four situations
(GAIN-ahead GAIN-behind, LOSS-ahead, LOSS-behind) using multiple choice lists. This
way, we obtain four situation-dependent altruism parameters for each subject (the choice
lists and a more detailed description of the procedure can be found in Appendix 2.7.2).
2.4.2 Decision screens and eye-tracking
In addition to choices we recorded subject’s gaze behavior. Each decision started with a
blank screen (3000ms), followed by a fixation cross (500ms) before subjects had to decide
about two simultaneously presented outcome allocations (Figure 17). The two options
differed on the dimension of own, other, differences, and sum of outcomes. All of this
information was presented on the screen to avoid any need for calculation and making the
information processing easily observable.
Figure 18 shows a schematic version of the decision screen. The location of the infor-
mation (e.g. which information was presented on the top) varied between subjects but
was constant over all trials for each individual subject.
Eye movements were recorded using three Eyegaze binocular remote systems with
13Money was put in a cup labeled with the amount that it was containing and placed right next to the
subject for the time of the experiment.
14At the same time average payoffs, sums and differences over all games are identical (with a margin
of 0.1e) between the left and right option.
15After finishing the 40 decision tasks, subjects also took part in the counterfactual treatment. Subjects
were aware that there was a second part involving some decisions but had no further information. Only
one choice of both these parts was paid. The specific decision was only revealed in the very end. In this
study we focus on the first part of the study since this provides us with the cleanest data. The data of
the counterfactual will be discussed in another paper but dis available on request.
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Figure 17: Sequence for each trial
sampling rate of 120 Hz and an accuracy of about 0.45 degree. Tasks were presented at
screen with a display resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. To secure data quality a chin rest
mounted 60 cm away from the screen was used to minimize head movements. Participants
indicated their choices by key press (“C” for the option on the left and “M” for the option
on the right). The Experiment was run in Presentation©.
For the analysis eight non-overlapping 100 x 100 pixels large areas of interest (AOIs)
were defined. All 8 AOIs contained payoff information (2 own payoffs, 2 other players
payoffs, 2 differences in payoffs, 2 sum in payoffs). Additional AOIs (100 x 190 pixels)
containing content labels as well as the information about Options (“A” and “B”) were
defined to check if the trials pass the common quality thresholds, but were not used
for the following analysis. The recorded choices as well as the eye-tracking data were
pre-processed via Stata13.
Fixations were defined as periods of relative stable gazes within an area of 30pixel.
Fixations shorter than 50 ms were excluded from the analysis. Decisions made faster than
200ms as well as tasks with duration longer than 3 standard deviations from the mean
(within the particular decision block) were excluded from the analysis. In total 11.59% of
recorded fixations were excluded this way. We analysed the number of fixations in each
AOI and the decision times.
2.4.3 Procedure
In total 87 individuals, 44 in loss and 43 in gain (overall 60% were female), were recruited
from the MPI Decision Lab Subject pool using Orsee (Greiner, 2015). All subjects had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was conducted in September 2014
at the MPI Decision Lab in Bonn. The task in the lab took on average 30 minutes and
subjects earned on average a total of 8.63 e.
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Figure 18: Decision screen (schematic)
2.5 Results
In this chapter, we test our hypothesis and provide additional results. First, we present
choice data and afterwards show the results of the process data.
2.5.1 Choices
Figure 19 shows the share of altruistic choices in both treatments split for situations
where decision makers are ahead or behind, i.e., when their income is above or below the
income of the other subject. We find a clear framing effect when subjects are ahead of the
other player with subjects in gain choosing the altruistic option more often compared
to subjects in loss. (55% vs. 38%). Using a conservative measure treating individual
mean cooperation rates as observations (N=87), we find that this difference is significant
(rank-sum test, p = 0.027).
Result 1. Subjects are more likely to choose the altruistic option in the gain-frame
compared to the loss-frame when their income is above the income of the receiver.
No such difference was found for situations in which the participant had lower payoffs
than her matched player (behind). If anything the loss frame induced participants to be
less altruistic in the gain frame compared to the loss frame (16% vs. 22%, rank-sum test,
p=0.183). Additionally, these results show that being ahead leads to a higher share of
altruistic choices independent of the frame (gain and loss, signed-rank test, p < 0.001).
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Figure 19: Altruistic choices by frame and relative income
Result 2. Subjects are more likely to choose the altruistic option when their income is
higher than the income of the receiver compared to situations with lower relative income.
On an individual level, our hypothesis state that the individual parameters as elicited
in the online pre-test should predict behaviour in the experiment. In total 77% of all
choices are predicted correctly this way.
As a further factor for the altruistic choice, the cost-benefit is be important. As we
described in the theory section, a higher cost-benefit ratio should lead to overall less
altruistic choices. The following random-effects logit regression (table 9) shows that this
is indeed the case. The main treatment effect for cases where subjects are ahead is
robust against this control also when including the interaction between treatment and
cost-benefit factor as well as the interaction term and order effects. Interestingly, for
behind the coefficient for the cost-benefit factor is larger, i.e., subjects react more towards
the efficiency of the altruistic choice.
2.5.2 Information search process
In order to explore whether and how framing influences the attentional process, we explore
the information search behavior during the decision making process. In particular we
examine the proportion of fixations to specific areas of interest (AOI, i.e., own gains /
losses, other players gains / losses, difference between gains / losses and the sum of the
own and the other players gains / losses), the overall number of fixations, and decision
times per trial. The proportion of fixations to a specific AOI will give us insights on the
relative weight that subjects put on this information. On the other hand, the absolute
number of fixations and the decision time is an indicator for the depth of the information
search and gives additional information on the complexity of the decisions.
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Table 9: Altruistic choices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ahead ahead ahead behind behind behind
LOSS -1.600∗ -1.447+ -1.472+ 0.813 1.149+ 1.138
(0.692) (0.760) (0.762) (0.626) (0.698) (0.699)
Cost-benefit -4.665∗∗∗ -4.494∗∗∗ -4.548∗∗∗ -6.714∗∗∗ -6.076∗∗∗ -6.113∗∗∗
(0.361) (0.502) (0.506) (0.522) (0.772) (0.774)
Interaction -0.341 -0.272 -1.092 -1.052
(0.706) (0.709) (1.026) (1.027)
Order effects YES YES
Constant 2.573∗∗∗ 2.491∗∗∗ 2.716∗∗∗ -0.655 -0.842 -1.039+
(0.522) (0.547) (0.568) (0.487) (0.515) (0.539)
Subjects 87 87 87 87 87 87
Observations 1740 1740 1740 1740 1740 1740
This table shows results from a random-effects logit regression. The dependent
variable is 1 for the altruistic choice and 0 for the selfish choice. loss is a dummy
taking 1 in the loss treatment and 0 in the gain treatment. “Cost-benefit” ranges
between 0.1 and 0.9. “Interaction” is the interaction term between the treatment
and the cost-benefit factor. “Order effects” controls for the trial order. Standard
errors are in parentheses. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
2.5.3 Proportion of attention to AOIs
The proportion of attention is defined as the relative number of fixations to a specific AOI
in relation to the total number of fixations on all AOIs in each trial. Figure 20 shows the
average proportion of fixations to the specific AOI in both frames.
Overall, subjects attend their own payoffs more (57%) than all the other information
combined with the other player’s payoff being the second most fixated information (26%),
the difference between payoffs being next (10%) and the sum of payoffs being the least
fixated information (7%).
Our data shows a clear difference in the information search behaviour between the two
frames. We treat the average proportion of attention for each subject as one observation
and find that subjects in gain fixate less on their own payoff than subjects in loss (53.7%
vs. 60.4%, rank-sum test, p = 0.014). The same holds true when restricting observations
to ahead (54.0% vs. 60.3%, rank-sum test, p = 0.0717) and behind (53.4% vs. 60.5%,
rank-sum test, p = 0.0880).
Result 3.In the loss-frame subjects fixate relatively more on own outcomes compared to
the gain-frame.
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Figure 20: Proportion of Attention to AOIs
But, there is no overall significant difference in the proportion of attention to own
payoffs in situations where subjects are ahead compared to when they are behind (57.1%
vs 57.0%, sign-rank test, p = 0.9571). The proportion of attention is also not significantly
different between ahead and behind when restricting observation to the gain treatment
(54.0% vs. 53.4%, sign-rank test, p = 0.8374) or the loss treatment (60.3% vs. 60.5%,
sign-rank test, p = 0.8848).
Result 4. The relative income does not influence the proportion of attention to the own
outcome.
On an individual level, we hypothesized that subjects with stronger altruistic prefer-
ences weight own payoffs in the information search process less than people with more
individualistic preferences. For the analysis we first look at each situation separately
and correlate individual averages of the proportion of attention to the own outcome with
the situation-dependent altruism parameter. We get a negative and significant correla-
tion for GAIN-ahead (Spearman’s, ρ = −0.5455, p < 0.001), GAIN-behind (Spearman’s,
ρ = −0.6443, p < 0.001) and LOSS-behind (Spearman’s, ρ = −0.4961, p < 0.001). For
LOSS-ahead the correlation is also negative but not significant (Spearman’s, ρ = −0.2488,
p = 0.1076). Additionally, pooling all four situations and using the average of the four
elicited altruism parameters for each subject we also find a negative and significant cor-
relation (Spearman’s, ρ = −0.6509, p < 0.001).
Result 5. More altruistic subjects fixate relatively less on their own outcome.
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2.5.4 Extent of information search
We use the absolute number of fixations as indicators for the depth of information search.
Since fixations are very stable with respect to their duration this relates directly to the
decision time. For the absolute number of fixations we count all fixations located within
the predefined AOIs containing payoff information.16
The average total number of fixations does not differ between treatments (gain: 19.7
loss: 20.1, rank-sum test p = 0.8833). The same holds true when restricting for situations
where subjects are ahead (20.1 vs. 19.4 fixations, rank-sum test, p = 0.9312) and behind
(20.0 vs. 20.2 fixations, rank-sum test, p = 0.5775).
Similarly, the decision time does not vary significantly between treatments (gain:
5.34s loss: 5.56s, rank-sum test p = 0.7265). Again, restricting for cases where subjects
are ahead or behind does not influence this difference (ahead: 5.41s vs. 5.28s, rank-sum
test, p = 0.9759; behind: 5.50s vs. 6.61s, p = 0.4550).
Finally, subjects do not gather more information or have longer decision times when
they are ahead compared to being behind (absolute number of fixations and decision time
in both frames, sign-rank test, p > 0.1)
Result 6. Decision times and the absolute number of fixations are not influenced by the
frame. Further, the relative income does not influence the extent of information search.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the influence of gain-loss framing on behavior in interdependent
social decisions. We observed subjects’ information search behavior using eye-tracking.
In our lab experiment we find that subjects facing a gain-frame are more likely to choose
the altruistic option compared to subjects facing a loss frame if their payoffs are higher
than the payoffs of the receiver. In cases where the payoff of the decision maker is lower
than that of the receiver subjects are overall less altruistic but we do not find a difference
between frames. Concerning the process data, we find that subjects in the loss frame fixate
relatively more on their own income compared to subjects in the gain frame independently
of whether their income is above or below that of the other subject.
Eye-tracking in combination with the choice data provides us with a rich data set.
This allows us to analyse the underlying mechanism behind choices. The process data
suggests that subjects that face losses weight their own payoffs higher in relation to the
receiver’s payoff compared to subjects that face gains. In effect this means that subjects
experience loss aversion more in the own-outcome domain compared to the other-outcome
domain, i.e., they put a higher weight on the losses to their own outcome compared to
losses of the other players outcome. This interpretation of the results is in line with the
16Also remember, that we excluded fixations to text-AOIs from the analysis. The number of fixations
is thus the number of fixations to value information only.
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notion of impure altruism or warm-glow giving (Andreoni, 1990). Subjects mainly care
about giving some amount but not necessarily about the utility of the receiver.
We employed a model of reference dependent altruism (Breitmoser and Tan, 2014)
and interpret it as a process model. The model, in combination with parameters elicited
before the experiment, proved to be capable of predicting 77% of subject’s choices in
our experiment correctly. Importantly, the eye-tracking data allows us to evaluate the
model’s assumptions. Subjects facing payoffs below their absolute reference point (loss-
frame) focus their attention more on their own outcome compared to subjects with an
income above their absolute reference point (gain-frame). This clear difference in infor-
mation search behavior is in line with the assumption that the absolute reference point
(here the endowment) influences altruistic preferences in a non-continuous way. Also, the
proportion of attention to the other-regarding information directly correlates with the
situation-dependent altruism parameters that we elicited in the online pre-test.
In contrast, we find a clear difference in choices between situations where subjects are
ahead of others compared to situations where they are behind in payoffs but at the same
time there is no difference in the information search behavior. This suggests that there is
a more fundamental difference between an absolute reference point (e.g., the endowment)
and a relative reference point (e.g., payoffs of the other subject). This deserves further
exploration in the light of models of reference dependent preferences (Kőszegi and Rabin,
2006; Schwerter, 2013).
Finally, our results might also be interpreted as indication for an alternative attention-
based channel through which framing influences choice. Previous results suggest that
framing influences attentional processes (Kovach et al., 2014). At the same time, re-
sults from neuroscience show that manipulating attention might influence choice (Armel
et al., 2008). Taken together, this provides the basis for a different, reversed mechanism:
Framing manipulates which information decision makers attend to and this influences the
decisions they make (see also Shimojo et al., 2003). When we interpret our results in this
way, the proportion of attention would not be a reflection of the underlying weighting
function but instead is driven by a preference for information (Falk and Zimmermann,
2014). For example, an altruistic subject is quite interested in another subject’s payoffs
while a purely selfish subject does not care at all about this information. This interest
could then in principle be biased by the context or frame. In our context, losses to the
own income would draw more attention than losses of other subjects. Then this would
lead to an “attentional bias” towards the own outcome which would prompt subjects to
make more selfish choices. The direction of the mechanism is still unclear. Does framing
influence preferences which then drive the information search behavior? Or are prefer-
ences rather constructed and therefore prone to be influenced by an attentional bias? In
order to test this one would have to manipulate attention directly (e.g., by highlighting
some information on the decision screen) and see whether this influences choices. This
provides a natural and important next step for our research.
56
The main goal of the paper is to improve the understanding of framing effects in social
interactions. In this paper we demonstrate that eye-tracking data complements choice
data in providing a rich data set and a powerful tool to improve and test assumptions
of theoretical models. Therefore, our paper contributes to the goal to develop “a more
unified approach toward decision-making” (Krajbich et al., 2014).
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Items
Table 10: Items in the experiment, numbers show final payoffs in e
Option A Option B Option A Option B
# own other own other # own other own other
1 5,5 1,32 4,94 4,13 21 2,99 3,5 1,79 6,61
2 4,64 4,06 5,15 1,41 22 3,25 4,36 2,64 6,13
3 4,3 3,95 4,82 1,28 23 1,96 7,44 2,87 5,09
4 5,08 4,32 5,62 1,52 24 3,23 5,15 3,76 4,06
5 2,85 6,62 3,4 3,69 25 5,27 3,24 6,08 1,78
6 2,68 3,47 2,1 7,11 26 7,08 1,44 5,54 3,65
7 1,3 7,3 1,87 3,35 27 5,84 3,29 6,87 1,45
8 1,37 7,67 2,1 3,92 28 6,37 1,91 5,72 3,03
9 4,83 3,82 5,55 1,3 29 2,05 6,74 3,44 4,75
10 5,49 1,38 4,85 4,51 30 1,29 5,29 1,9 4,1
11 4,48 4,18 5,08 1,42 31 2,95 3,61 2,01 5,39
12 4,69 4,32 5,24 1,79 32 1,46 7,52 3,34 4,6
13 2,72 4,32 1,98 6,86 33 6,28 2,61 6,79 1,98
14 2,75 4,35 2,22 6,96 34 5,03 1,67 3,58 3,32
15 1,61 5,55 2,26 2,82 35 6,01 2,74 4,93 4,17
16 2,89 3,27 1,83 7,43 36 6,26 2,95 6,81 2,29
17 6,31 1,3 5,18 3,86 37 3,9 4,6 1,51 7,62
18 5,7 2,45 5,04 3,78 38 3,45 5,55 1,52 7,96
19 5,97 1,89 4,95 4,55 39 4,37 4,88 3,46 5,92
20 4,33 1,87 3,76 3,3 40 2,29 4,52 1,7 5,28
2.7.2 Online pre-test
Before the main experiment subjects took part in an online pre-test. Participants were
faced with four multiple choice lists (MCL) as seen below. For each row they had to
indicate whether they want to choose option A or option B. At the end of the experiment,
one row from one randomly selected MCL was randomly selected and became payoff
relevant for the decision maker and one other subject. The MCL were designed such that
participants are expected to choose Option A for some rows and then switch to Option
B for the remaining rows or, alternatively, choose Option B in all rounds. We choose
this switching point as the point of indifference between Option A and Option B. This
provides us with an altruism parameter for each MCL. Each MCL relates to one situation
from the lab experiment, i.e., 2 MCLs feature decisions over gains and 2 MCLs feature
decisions over losses. For gains and losses one table only has options where the subject
earns more than the other subject and one where he earns less. All participants in the
study were consistent in the sense that they indicated only one switching point for each
MCL.
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Table 11: GAIN-ahead
Option A Option B α for indifference
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.86 e; 1.00 e) 0.05
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.82 e; 1.00 e) 0.1
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.74 e; 1.00 e) 0.2
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.66 e; 1.00 e) 0.3
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.58 e; 1.00 e) 0.4
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.50 e; 1.00 e) 0.5
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.42 e; 1.00 e) 0.6
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.34 e; 1.00 e) 0.7
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.26 e; 1.00 e) 0.8
(1.90 e; 0.20 e) (1.10 e; 1.00 e) 1
Table 12: GAIN-behind
Option A Option B α for indifference
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.96 e; 1.90 e) 0.05
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.92 e; 1.90 e) 0.1
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.84 e; 1.90 e) 0.2
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.76 e; 1.90 e) 0.3
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.68 e; 1.90 e) 0.4
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.60 e; 1.90 e) 0.5
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.52 e; 1.90 e) 0.6
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.44 e; 1.90 e) 0.7
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.36 e; 1.90 e) 0.8
(1.00 e; 1.10 e) (0.20 e; 1.90 e) 1
59
Table 13: LOSS-ahead
Option A Option B α for indifference
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-0.24 e; -1.10 e) 0.05
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-0.28 e; -1.10 e) 0.1
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-0.36 e; -1.10 e) 0.2
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-0.44 e; -1.10 e) 0.3
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-0.52 e; -1.10 e) 0.4
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-0.60 e; -1.10 e) 0.5
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-0.68 e; -1.10 e) 0.6
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-0.76 e; -1.10 e) 0.7
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-0.84 e; -1.10 e) 0.8
(-0.20 e; -1.90 e) (-1.00 e; -1.10 e) 1
Table 14: LOSS-behind
Option A Option B α for indifference
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.18 e; -0.20 e) 0.05
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.26 e; -0.20 e) 0.1
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.34 e; -0.20 e) 0.2
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.42 e; -0.20 e) 0.3
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.50 e; -0.20 e) 0.4
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.58 e; -0.20 e) 0.5
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.66 e; -0.20 e) 0.6
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.74 e; -0.20 e) 0.7
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.82 e; -0.20 e) 0.8
(-1.10 e; -1.00 e) (-1.90 e; -0.20 e) 1
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2.7.3 Instructions
The original instructions in German are available from the authors upon request. Below
is the English translation of the instructions used in treatment gain. Differences in the
instructions in treatment loss are marked by square brackets ”[...]“.
Information about the Experiment
Welcome to the Experiment!
Please read the following information carefully. In the instructions you will learn what
you need in order to participate in the study. If you have any questions please indicate
it. We will answer the question at your seat.
The study today consist of two parts. In each of the two parts you will make a series of
decisions. At the end of today’s session one of the decisions of one of the two parts will be
selected. This decision will then be payoff relevant for you and another participant. You
will receive your part of the payment at the end of today’s sessions. The other participant
will not be a participant of the current session but a participant of one of the following
sessions. This participant will have the identical task and instructions as you.
Accordingly, for every other subject that took part in a session before your session, one
of his decisions was selected for payment. You will receive, additionally to the payment
based on your decision, a payment that is based on a decision that another participant
in another session made. This participant will have the identical task and instructions as
you.
Additionally, you will receive the payment of your online questionnaire.
You will receive complete information about the decisions before the start of each part.
Part 1
In this part of the experiment you start with an endowment of 0.25 e [9 e] which you
find in the box in front of you.
In the following you will face a series of 40 decision task. In each of the tasks you need
to decide how to split a gain [loss] between you and another randomly determined person.
In each task you can choose between two options (left and right side) and thereby decide
how to split gains [losses] between yourself and another person. Your decision is made by
pressing the keys A and B marked in red. There are no right or wrong answers in this
task.
After completion of the first part we will hand out information for the second part
and store your endwoment until the payment.
Example:
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Figure 21: This is how the decision task will look like on the screen
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3 Leadership Effectiveness and Institutional Frames
3.1 Introduction
Leader-follower relationships are observed in many institutions in the areas of economic,
political, and societal life. A potential reason is that the effectiveness of institutions
is likely to be affected by leadership. In fact, within the prominent paradigm of social
dilemmas that we study in this paper, leadership is sometimes even seen as one of the
key factors that shape cooperation (e.g., Ostrom, 2009, identifies it as a key factor for
sustaining social-ecological systems). For example, by granting the leader authority in the
form of punishment or exclusion power, free-riding incentives of the group members can
be mitigated (e.g., Güth et al., 2007). Yet, even in the absence of such strong institutional
mechanisms of authority, leaders can have a positive effect due to “leading-by-example",
though the empirical evidence is sometimes mixed (e.g., Gächter and Renner, 2004, Rivas
and Sutter, 2011). It thus seems important to assess the virtues of leadership within
the context of the other factors that shape the situation at hand. In this paper, we
explore to what extent leadership behavior and leadership effectiveness are shaped by
mere institutional framing; studying in particular the stability of cooperative behavior at
the individual level between “positive” and “negative” frames.
In order to do so, we use laboratory experiments that are partly based on a setup
introduced in Cox et al. (2013). The design allows for a paired comparison of positive and
negative frames (see also Andreoni 1995, Sonnemans et al. 1998, Park 2000 or Dufwenberg
et al. 2011 for corresponding simultaneous-move games). In the positive frame (“Give-
some” treatments), subjects are endowed and can give (contribute) to the common pool.
In the negative frame (“Take-some” treatments), the payoff functions and other basic
elements of the situation are exactly identical — with the exception that subjects are not
endowed but can take (withdraw) from the common pool. The game is played sequentially,
with an entitled leader moving first and three followers, observing the leader’s decision,
moving second.17
In treatments Give-R and Take-R, the stage game is played repeatedly for ten
periods. In treatments Give and Take, it is only played once, but we use a strategy-
method approach on the second stage to precisely measure followers’ reactions to leaders’
decisions at the individual level. By eliciting followers’ decisions conditional on each
possible action of the leader, we can classify subjects into selfish types or conditional
cooperators (with respect to the leader’s decisions) and compare these types and their
specific reactions between positive and negative institutional frames.
We find that leaders’ behavior, followers’ reactions and consequently the effectiveness
of the leadership institution are strongly influenced by the institutional frame. Leaders
under the positive frame on average contribute more than twice as much as leaders under
17Entitlement is induced by choosing the leader based on his or her performance in a general-knowledge
quiz.
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the negative frame leave in the common pool (12.67 tokens contributed in Give vs. 6.17
tokens left in Take). With respect to followers’ behavior, we find that the institutional
framing substantially shapes the distribution of revealed cooperation types. While in
Give 67% of followers act as conditional cooperators and 14% as free riders, in Take
only about one third of followers exhibit conditionally cooperative behavior, and an even
larger fraction engages in free riding. These differences in leaders’ and followers’ behavior
between frames have straightforward consequences in terms of social efficiency. While the
average pool size is 40.67 tokens under the positive frame, on average only 23.83 tokens
remain in the common pool under the negative frame. Similar results are observed in
our repeated game setting. Over the course of 10 periods, both leaders and followers
contribute less under the negative frame. On average, subjects in Give-R contribute
11.6 tokens while subjects in Take-R leave only 6.7 tokens.
The findings of our paper inform the growing literature on the effectiveness of leader-
ship in social dilemmas (e.g., Gächter and Renner, 2004; Güth et al., 2007; Levati et al.,
2007; Potters et al., 2007; Haigner and Walkobinger, 2010; Rivas and Sutter, 2011). So
far, this strand of literature has established an unambiguously positive effect of leading
by example only if leadership is endogenous. Our paper also adds to the literature on
framing effects in social dilemmas which so far has produced mixed evidence (e.g., Go-
erg and Walkowitz, 2010). While some papers report higher total contributions under
the negative frame (e.g., Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Sell and Son, 1997; Sell et al., 2002;
Dufwenberg et al., 2011), other papers find a framing effect in the opposite direction
(e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Park, 2000). We enrich this dis-
cussion on framing effects by studying them under a sequential setting. Closest to our
work is Cox et al. (2013). However, our sequential framework consists of a first-moving
leader and second-moving followers, whereas Cox et al. (2013) implement the reverse
move order. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge we are among the first to introduce a
strategy-method approach in such a framework to exactly measure followers’ reactions to
leaders’ decisions and to cleanly compare these reactions between positive and negative
institutional frames.18
The data from our experiment suggest that, at least in our setup, individual coopera-
tion types seem to be malleable. In this regard, our results are in line with Blanco et al.
(2011). They find that social preferences, specifically inequality aversion, are not stable
across different games. If the malleability of cooperation types translates into other set-
ups as well, it might be of general interest for the literature measuring social preferences
(e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010, who also use a strategy
method to identify cooperation types in social dilemmas, but only in a positive frame).
Moreover, it might be of relevance for studies that measure cooperation preferences in one
18In a recent paper, Cartwright and Lovett (2013) interpret the conditional-cooperation measure in
Fischbacher et al. (2001) as a situation where one follower reacts to the average contribution of three
leaders, and compare it to a situation where three followers react to the contribution of a single leader.
They find no differences in elicited cooperation types between the follower-average and the leader-followers
conditions.
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game and use them as a predictor in their main experiment—in particular when subjects’
interpretation of the frame potentially changes between games.
From a policy perspective, our results are telling as well. Assuming that the lab
evidence translates to the field (e.g., see Rustagi et al., 2010), our results underline that
leaders can potentially affect followers’ behavior and mitigate social dilemmas. At the
same time, our findings show that the example provided by the leader must be desirable.19
Finally, in particular when a leadership mechanism is in place, policy makers who care
about social efficiency might want to set the institutional frame such that it addresses the
positive aspects (do something good, give something, contribute) rather than it focuses on
the negative aspects of behavior (do not do something bad, do not withhold something,
do not withdraw).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2 we describe our
experimental design. In chapter 3 we present the results of the experiment and in chapter 4
we discuss these results and conclude.
3.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment features a social dilemma. Each of n = 4 players has to choose how to
allocate a given amount of tokens between a private and a public account (group account).
Each token allocated to the public account yields a marginal per capita return of α = 0.4,
i.e., the sum of tokens allocated to the public account is multiplied by 1.6 before being
distributed equally among all four players. Tokens in players’ private accounts increase
only the respective player’s payoff. Given that 1/n < α < 1, players face a social dilemma
because tokens allocated to the group account are socially efficient, while it would be
individually rational for egocentric payoff-maximizers to allocate all tokens to the private
account.
We study a sequential version of this social dilemma under two institutional frames,
i) a give-some as well as ii) a take-some frame, both as a repeated and an one-shot game
(2x2 design). The frame is manipulated between treatments. The treatments Take
and Give (Take-R and Give-R, respectively, for the repeated game) only differ with
respect to wording and to the initial token allocation. In treatments Give/Give-R, each
player is endowed with E = 20 tokens in the private account while the group account is
initially empty. By contrast, players in treatments Take/Take-R do not have an initial
endowment in their private accounts (E = 0), but the group account initially consists of
nE = 4 · 20 = 80 tokens. Subjects in Give/Give-R have to decide how many tokens
they want to contribute to the public account, whereas subjects in Take/Take-R have to
19In this respect, our work is also connected to papers that study the role of social information in social
dilemmas (e.g. Engel et al., 2011; Shang and Croson, 2009; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Berg et al.,
1995). These studies show that positive examples can foster cooperation, increase donations, or promote
trusting behavior. At the same time, some of these studies also demonstrate that negative examples can
be detrimental to the problem at hand. Moreover, Baumeister et al. (2001) stress that, in general, bad
information is processed more thoroughly than good information and suggest that “bad is stronger than
good, as a general principle across a broad range of psychological phenomena” (p.323).
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decide how many tokens they want to withdraw from the public account. Importantly, each
subject’s action space is identical in all treatments, i.e., up to 20 tokens can be contributed
to the public account in Give/Give-R, and be withdrawn from the public account in
Take/Take-R, respectively. Consequently, the payoff space is identical between frames.
Each subject’s payoff pii is given by the number of tokens in his private account and 0.4
times the total number of tokens in the group account, irrespective of the frame being
used. However, in order to reflect the difference in initial endowments between both
treatments, subject i’s payoff in the give and take frame can be rewritten as:
piGivei = 20− gi + 0.4 · (0 + gi +
∑
j 6=i
gj)
piTakei = 0 + ti + 0.4 · (80− ti −
∑
j 6=i
tj) ,
(15)
with gi and ti being the number of tokens subject i contributes to the public account or
withdraws from it, respectively.
Given that we are interested in leadership effectiveness, the game is implemented
in a sequential move order. Instead of having all group members take their decision
simultaneously, one group member, which we refer to as the leader, decides about his
allocation before the others (followers) do.20
The sequential move order is implemented in all treatments. The conditions differ
with respect to the frequency with which subjects face the social dilemma described above
and with respect to the method in which subjects make their decisions. In treatments
Give-R and Take-R, subjects play 10 iterations of the game within the same group of
subjects (partner design). The same subject is the leader over all 10 periods. Followers
can observe the actual contribution decision of their leader and afterwards take their
own contribution decision. Leaders then learn about followers’ reactions and can adjust
their own behavior in subsequent periods. Since subjects were also informed about the
total contribution to the public account and their earnings, this might induce reputation
building and learning effects. By contrast, subjects in treatments Give and Take play
a pure one-shot implementation of the game, where follower’s responses to the leader
decisions are elicited using the strategy method (Selten, 1967).
Under the strategy method, followers have to indicate for each of the 21 possible con-
tributions or requests by the leader how many tokens they want to contribute to the public
account or withdraw from it, respectively. Only after all followers have submitted a com-
plete strategy profile, the leader’s actual decision is revealed and followers’ decisions are
implemented accordingly. This approach renders followers’ decisions directly comparable
between treatments, irrespective of potential differences in leaders’ choices between the
20The group leader is determined based on subjects’ performance in a general-knowledge quiz taking
place before the actual experiment. The quiz consists of 20 multiple-choice questions. When answering
these questions, subjects know that other parts of the experiment will follow, but they do not know about
the game that will be played in these parts. The role of the leader is assigned to the best performing
subject in each group.
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give-some and take-some frame. It also allows to study changes in followers’ behavior at
the individual level by classifying each follower according to his individual contribution
or withdrawal profile, respectively.
3.2.1 Predictions
The Nash-equilibrium predictions for self-centered agents who maximize their own mone-
tary payoff are identical in all treatments: all subjects free-ride, i.e., they always allocate
the maximum amount of 20 tokens to their private account, although it would be socially
efficient to allocate all tokens to the public account. This implies that subjects’ behavior
is predicted to coincide in the give- and take-frames. The same is, ceteris paribus, also
true under any outcome-based model of social preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
To hypothesize differences in behavior between the two institutional frames, one would
need, for example, i) differences in beliefs about others’ types in an outcome-oriented
model, or ii) differences in beliefs about social norms or prescriptions in a norm-based or
identity-based model (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), or iii) differences in the reference
point in models of reciprocity (e.g., Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger, 2004). In the Appendix, we discuss one specific model in detail, namely Revealed
Altruism Theory by Cox et al. (2008). It predicts differences between the two frames in
the context of the sequential games examined in this study.
3.2.2 Procedures
The studies were conducted in July 2013 and February 2014 at the Laboratory for Exper-
imental Economics at the University of Bonn (BonnEconLab), using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007b) for the experiment and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) for the recruitment. We randomly
recruited from the entire subject pool at the BonnEconLab, which at that time consisted
of about 6300 subjects, most of them undergraduate students of all majors from the Uni-
versity of Bonn. In total, we invited 240 subjects. Subjects were assigned randomly to
one of the four treatments and each subject participated in only one treatment. 96 sub-
jects participated in the Take and Give treatments, leaving us with a total of 12 leaders
and 36 followers in each of those treatments (respectively 2 · 36 · 21 = 1512 data points
for followers when taking into account that they make their decision contingent on each
of the leader’s 21 possible allocations). Furthermore, 144 subjects participated in the
Take-R and Give-R treatments, so that there were 18 leaders and 54 followers in each
of those treatments (summing up to a total of 2 · 18 · 10 = 360 data points for leaders and
2 · 54 · 10 = 1080 data points for followers).
Upon arrival at the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to private cubicles and
received written instructions, which were also read out aloud to the subjects to create
common knowledge about the game being played.21 To ensure that participants had
21Instructions and screenshots can be found in the Appendix.
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understood the basic game structure, in particular the consequences of own and group
members’ contributions to the public account, they had to answer control questions. Only
after having solved these questions correctly could subjects proceed to the experiment.
Throughout the study, interaction was anonymous and subjects did not learn about the
identity of other participants they were interacting with. The experiment ended with
a short questionnaire. Afterwards, subjects received feedback about the outcomes of
the experiment and were then paid in private. Tokens earned in the experiment were
converted at a rate of 1 Token = 0.20e. Subjects in Take-R and Give-R were paid
for one randomly selected period. Including the show-up fee of 4e, subjects earned on
average 8.97e in treatments Take and Give and 9.22e in treatments Take-R and
Give-R. Each session lasted about 50 minutes in Take and Give and about 60 minutes
in Take-R and Give-R.
3.3 Results
We first report results on followers’ decisions from the strategy method in treatments
Give and Take. As will be seen, followers’ behavior differs significantly between the
institutional frames, both on average and at the individual level. This difference seems
to be anticipated by the leaders, as the subsequent analysis of leaders’ decisions shows.
Afterwards, we derive implications for efficiency in terms of players’ realized payoffs. We
then demonstrate to what extent the findings from the pure one-shot game translate into
the repeated game in treatments Give-R and Take-R. The results section concludes by
presenting suggestive evidence, based on data from the ex-post questionnaire, on potential
causes of the change in behavior, and by discussing our results in the light of a model of
revealed altruism (Cox et al., 2008).
Please note that for treatment comparisons to be easy to understand, we report sub-
jects’ decisions in both frames in terms of contributions, i.e., the withdrawal of ti tokens
from the public account in the take frame corresponds to a contribution of gi = 20 − ti
tokens. Finally, recall that subjects were randomly assigned to treatments. Behavioral
differences between treatments should therefore primarily be driven by the difference in
frames.
3.3.1 Behavior in the one-shot situation (GIVE and TAKE)
For each possible contribution decision of the leader, the left-hand side of Figure 22
shows the corresponding contribution from the followers, averaged over all followers in
the respective treatment.22
First, in both treatments we see that leaders’ contributions affect followers’ contingent
decisions under the strategy method. There is a significant positive correlation between
leaders’ and followers’ contributions in both treatments. If we take the average contribu-
22The contribution plans for each individual subject can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 22: Average contribution plans
tion from followers for each given decision from the leader, we get Spearman’s ρ = 0.991
in Take and ρ = 1.0 in Give, both with p ≤ 0.001.23 Second, the average contribu-
tion plans differ between treatments. For low contributions from the leaders, followers in
Take contribute more than followers in Give; and vice versa for high contributions by
the leaders.
This difference can also be seen in the following regression model:
cfi = β0 + β1cl + β2take+ β3cltake+ i , (16)
where cf is the contribution made by followers, cl the leader’s contribution, Take is the
treatment dummy which takes the value of 1 in Take and 0 in Give, and cl × Take
captures the interaction effects between leader’s contribution and treatment. Table 15
lists the corresponding estimates. Estimates in Column (1) and Column (2) are based
on the entire sample, with the difference being that additional covariates (gender, age,
self-reported measures of risk and trust) are included in Column (2) to check for the
robustness of the results. As we already observed in Figure 22, higher contributions
from leaders induce higher contributions from followers in both treatments, but slope
and intercept of the contribution profiles differ between treatments. The coefficient for
cl is significant and positive, 0.534 in Give and 0.304 (= 0.534 − 0.230) in Take. The
difference in slopes of -0.230 is significant, but the coefficient for the treatment dummy
Take just falls short of being significant (p = 0.117).
Result 1. In the one-shot game, followers’ contributions react to leaders’ contribution in
both frames, but the average contribution profiles differ between the give- and take-frame.
23This conservative calculation is based on 21 observations per treatment. If we use each follower’s
individual contribution instead of the average contribution over all followers, we get Spearman’s ρ = 0.200
in Take and ρ = 0.458 in Give, both with p ≤ 0.001 but now based on 756 observations per treatment.
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Table 15: Followers’ contribution decisions (one-shot games)
(1) (2) (3)
cl 0.534∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗
(0.0734) (0.0734) (0.0543)
Take 2.360 2.516 -0.706
(1.462) (1.606) (1.306)
cl × Take -0.230∗ -0.230∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.1159) (0.0835)
Trust 0.871∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.255) (0.2006)
Gender 0.093 -0.507
(1.5953) (0.8848)
Age -0.188 -0.004
(0.1927) (0.0641)
Risk -0.078 -0.0585
(0.2500) (0.1853)
Constant 1.539∗ 1.963 0.7614
(0.807) (4.073) (1.518)
Observations 1512 1512 735
Subjects 72 72 35
Sample full full cond.coop.
Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates from a regression with errors
clustered on the individual level. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
dependent variable is the amount contributed by the follower for any possible
contribution “cl” of the leader. The variable “Take” is a dummy variable
indicating treatment Take. Gender is 1 for male and 0 for female. Risk and
Trust are self-reported measures elicited in the ex-post questionnaire, both
ranging between 0 (low trust/risk averse) and 10 (high trust/risk seeking).
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Standard errors are in parentheses
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The next question we address is why we observe the difference in the average contri-
bution profile of followers. One possibility is that all subjects react less strongly to the
leader’s decision in Take, but the individual data tell a different story. Having access to
the complete contribution plans of followers, we can use a type classification similar to
the one introduced in Fischbacher et al. (2001) to discriminate between i) subjects who
free-ride on the leader’s contributions, ii) subjects who conditionally cooperate with re-
spect to the leader’s’ contribution, and iii) other subjects that do not fall into the previous
categories. More precisely, we use the following classification strategy:
i) free riders: subjects who contributes exactly zero for all 21 possible contributions
of the leader
ii) conditional cooperators: subjects with a positive Spearman correlation coefficient
ρci,cl > 0 between own contributions and leader’s contributions that reaches a level
of significance of p ≤ 0.01
iii) others: subjects who are neither free-riders nor conditional cooperators
Table 16: Distribution of types
Type Give Take
free-riders 5 (14%) 13 (36%)
conditional cooperators 24 (67%) 11 (31%)
others 7 (19%) 12 (33%)
Table 16 shows the distribution of types between treatments. We observe strong
treatment differences (Pearson χ2-test, p = 0.008). In treatment Give, the number of
subjects being categorized as conditional cooperators is more than twice as high as in
Take (24 vs. 11 subjects). At the same time, only about half as many subjects are
categorized as free-riders in Give than in Take (5 vs. 13), the same being true for the
number of subjects classified as ‘others’ (7 vs. 12).24 Considering that the treatments are
randomly assigned to subjects, one should expect to see roughly the same distribution of
types in both treatments. Instead, it seems that cooperation types are not stable but are
prone to changes in the institutional frame.
Alternatively it might be that the cooperation types as measured here do not neces-
sarily account for the complexity of ‘real’ cooperation type of subjects. In particular it
is possible that cooperative behavior is not fixed but the result of an underlying mecha-
nism which is influenced by framing. We discuss a model describing such a mechanism
further below. It is also important to note that we elicit contributions contingent only on
24In total, 26.4% of followers are categorized as ’others’. Within this classification type, there is a large
heterogeneity in contribution patterns, e.g., some subjects contribute a positive but constant amount for
all decisions of leaders while some subjects show more ’random’ patterns.
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the leader’s decisions. While followers cannot contingent their decisions on the actions
of the other followers, this allows for a clear focus on the leader-follower relationship. It
is possible, however, that part of the change in followers’ contribution plans is because
the frames change their beliefs about the contribution plans of the other followers. In
particular subjects might contribute only little or even free ride when they expect other
followers to do so. Recognizing these points we refer to the elicited types as revealed
cooperation types.
Result 2. The distributions of revealed cooperation types differ significantly between the
take- and the give-frame.
When we compare the behavior of subjects within a given cooperation category, by
definition we do not observe differences for free-riders (they always contribute nothing).
We also do not observe significant differences for ‘others’. However, as the right-hand side
of Figure 22 shows, we do find significant effects for conditional cooperators. Conditional
cooperators in treatment Take frequently match leaders’ contributions or even surpass
them, while they stay below leaders’ contributions in Give. This can also be seen in
Column (3) of Table 15, where we re-run the regression of followers’ contributions on
leader’s contribution, but restricted to the sample of conditional cooperators. The coef-
ficient for cl× Take is positive and significant, implying that the average contribution
plan of conditional cooperators has a statistically higher slope in Take compared toGive
(1.04 instead of 0.8 per token contributed by the leader).
Result 3. For conditional cooperators, the positive impact of leaders’ contributions on
followers’ contributions is significantly more pronounced in the take- than in the give-
frame.
To wrap up, with respect to contributions the take-some frame has a positive effect on
those followers who condition their behavior on the leader’s decision — but at the same
time the probability for being such a conditional cooperator is reduced under the take-
some frame. At least in our sample, the latter effect dominates. Therefore, the marginal
effect of an additional token contributed by the leader is on average smaller in Take than
in Give.
Interestingly, leaders seem to anticipate the difference in followers’ behavior, since
they contribute more than double the amount in treatment Give than in Take. They
contribute on average 12.67 tokens in Give and only 6.17 tokens in Take, the differ-
ence being significant (rank-sum test, p = 0.0263). The difference in means is due to a
significant difference in the distributions between Give and Take (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
exact test, p = 0.092). While in Take one third of the leaders contribute nothing at
all, in Give all leaders contribute a positive amount and one third even contribute the
maximum amount.
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Result 4. Leaders’ contributions in the one-shot game are significantly lower in the take-
than in the give-frame.
If we apply leaders’ decisions to followers’ contribution plans to derive the actual
realizations of contributions and payoffs, we observe that the sum of contributions to the
public account is almost 50% lower in Take than in Give (23.8 vs. 40.7 tokens, rank-
sum test, p = 0.1257), which implies that the leadership institution is less efficient in a
take-frame than in a give-frame.
Result 5. Combining leadership behavior and followers’ reactions in the one-shot setting,
the leadership institution is found to be less efficient in the take-frame than in the give-
frame.
3.3.2 Behavior in the repeated game (Give-R and Take-R)
In the following, we test if the above differences between Take and Give persist in
repeated interactions, where reputation and learning effects come into play. We first
compare average contributions between the two treatments of the repeated game. Subse-
quently, we check for differences in leadership behavior, differences in followers’ reactions
to their leader’s contribution, both at the individual and aggregate level, and the resulting
payoff consequences.25
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Figure 23: Average contributions over time
The left-hand side of Figure 23 shows average contributions to the public account for
each of the ten periods in Give-R and Take-R, respectively.26 The graph suggests a
strong difference in contributions between treatments. Non-parametric analysis based on
25One should keep in mind, however, that the identification of cooperation types and differences in
leadership now becomes more difficult and less reliable due to endogeneity problems (followers’ behavior
can only be observed with respect to a specific leadership contribution at the same time influencing
leader’s decisions in the following period, etc.).
26Observations for each individual group can be found in the Appendix.
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matching group averages confirms this observation and reveals that individuals contribute
significantly more in Give-R than in Take-R (Give-R: 11.45, Take-R: 6.7, rank-sum
test p < 0.001) over all periods. The same holds true when looking at leaders and
followers separately (leaders: 13.27 vs. 8.65; followers: 10.84 vs. 6.04; both rank-sum tests
p < 0.001), as can be seen on the right-hand side of Figure 23. Overall, the sum of
contributions at the group level is thus substantially lower in Take-R than in Give-R
(26.8 vs. 45.8 tokens, rank-sum test p = 0.0266).
Result 6. In the repeated setting, both leaders and followers contribute significantly more
tokens to the public account in the give- than in the take-frame. Consequently, the lead-
ership institution is found to be less efficient in the take- than in the give-frame.
Interestingly, these differences occur although the initial contributions are very similar
in both treatments. Average contributions, however, decrease much stronger in Take-R
than in Give-R as the game proceeds. In part, this can be attributed to differences in
leadership behavior. We see that leaders react very differently to followers’ contributions in
the first period. Moreover, from period two on, leaders’ contributions differ significantly
between treatments. Compared to Take-R, their average contribution in Give-R is
more than 50% larger. Like in the one-shot situation, the difference in means is due to
a significant difference in the distributions between Give-R and Take-R (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov exact test, p = 0.040). While leaders in Take-R contribute nothing at all in
38.3% of all cases, in Give-R leaders contribute a positive amount in 88.3% of all cases
and even contribute the maximum amount in more than half the number of cases (52.8%,
compared to 27.2% in Take-R).
Result 7. In the repeated setting, leaders’ contributions are significantly lower in the the
take- than in the give-frame.
The second reason behind the stronger decline in contributions in Take-R can be
found when looking at followers’ behavior. On the one hand, there are more free-riders in
Take-R than in Give-R. Using the same classification approach as above, in treatment
Take-R (Give-R), we observe 11 (9) conditional cooperators, 12 (1) free-riders and 31
(44) others. The difference in distributions of revealed cooperation types is significant
(Pearson χ2-test, p = 0.003).27 On the other hand, leading by example has a stronger
impact on followers in Give-R than in Take-R. Follower contributions correlate with
leader contributions in both treatments but the correlation is stronger in Give-R (Spear-
man’s ρ = 0.7372, p < 0.001) than in Take-R (Spearman’s ρ = 0.5528, p < 0.001).
This holds true even when controlling for the differences in leaders’ contributions and
27However, in contrast to the one-shot situation, where leader’s contributions were strictly exogenous
due to our use of the strategy method, the classification from the repeated-game data should be in-
terpreted with caution. Leadership behavior differs between treatments, making it difficult to compare
followers’ responses between treatments. Additionally, over the course of the game followers are usually
not confronted with every possible leader contribution but only with a restricted subset. Thus, many
subjects cannot be classified at all in the repeated game and end up as ‘others’.
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Table 17: Followers’ contribution decisions - repeated game
(1) (2)
Period -0.246∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
(0.0811) (0.0811)
Take -0.0141 0.0255
(1.594) (1.5207)
Period × Take -0.162 -0.164
(0.1171) (0.1167)
cl 0.540∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.0459) (0.0454)
cl × Take -0.162∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.0582) (0.0577)
Trust 0.323∗∗∗
(0.1167)
Gender -0.681
(0.6750)
Age 0.151
(0.1388)
Risk -0.282∗∗
(0.1235)
Constant 5.035∗∗∗ 1.738
(1.1902) ( 3.3931)
Observations 1080 1080
Subjects 108 108
Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates from a mixed-effects model allow-
ing for heterogenous errors on the individual level nested in groups. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the amount contributed by
the follower. Period is the period in which the contribution is made.“cl” is the
contribution of the leader. The variable “Take” is a dummy variable indicating
treatment Take. “Period× Take” and “cl× Take” are interaction terms with
the treatment dummy. Gender is 1 for male and 0 for female. Risk and Trust
are self-reported measures elicited in the ex-post questionnaire, both ranging
between 0 (low trust/risk averse) and 10 (high trust/risk seeking). Significance
levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
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adding controls for followers’ individual characteristics, as can be seen from the results
of mixed-effects regressions in Table 17. Followers’ contributions are increasing in leader
contributions but significantly less so in Take-R as compared to Give-R. The effect is
sizable. For each token contributed by the leader, followers contribute on average about
0.54 tokens in Give-R and only about 0.38 tokens in Take-R.28
Result 8. In the repeated setting, followers’ contributions are positively affected by an
increase in leaders’ contributions. The effect is significantly stronger in the give- than in
the take-frame.
To wrap up, we saw that the differences between the take- and give-frame observed
in the one-shot setting persist in a multiple-period decision setting that allows for group
dynamics to evolve. In both one-shot and repeated situations, followers react less strongly
to leaders’ contributions and leaders contribute less in the negative frame than in the
positive frame. Consequently, leading by example is significantly less efficient in the take-
than in the give-frame. Below, we present suggestive evidence for potential reasons behind
the behavioral differences of leaders and followers.
3.3.3 Potential explanations for differences in behavior
The differences in leadership behavior between treatments might potentially be explained
by leaders’ perception of the situation. In the ex-post questionnaire, we asked leaders
how responsible they felt for their group (on an 11-point Likert scale). For the one-shot
setup we find that leaders in Give feel significantly more responsible for their group than
leaders in Take (6.25 vs. 4.08, rank-sum test, p = 0.0355). We also asked leaders about
different aspects that might have been of importance for their decision, and observe that
leaders in Take state having cared significantly less about others’ trustworthiness (8.25
vs. 5.66, rank-sum test p = 0.0091) and about fairness considerations (6.42 vs. 4.5, rank-
sum test p = 0.0961) than in treatment Give. These observations suggest that leaders
perceive the two frames differently, as the focus in the take-frame seems to shift away
from social aspects like fairness, trust and responsibility. Interestingly, these significant
differences in perception are not observed in the repeated setup, although we did observe
differences in leaders’ contribution behavior between both frames of the repeated game.
This might imply that the difference in frames does not affect leaders’ perceptions at all
in a multi-period setup. It might also be that the motives found to be of importance in
the one-shot situation are overridden by reputational motives which are not sufficiently
captured by our questionnaire items; or that they do matter initially, but are subsequently
“washed out” by the repeated exposure of leaders to disappointing experiences in both
treatments of the repeated game (followers undercutting the leader’s contribution).
28Consequently, every token invested by the leader leads on average to an increase of the tokens
invested by the whole group of 1+3*0.54=2.62 in Give-R and only 1+3*0.38=2.14 in Take-R, meaning
that investment just pays off in monetary terms in Give-R (2.62 ∗ 0.4 = 1.05 > 1) but does not pay off
in Take-R (2.14 ∗ 0.4 = 0.86).
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By contrast, for followers the treatment differences in questionnaire responses are more
pronounced in the repeated rather than in the one-shot situation. Followers having ex-
perienced the repeated game report i) that they feel more responsible towards the leader
(5.67 vs. 3.7, rank-sum test, p = 0.0039), ii) that they care more about the total group
payoff (6.74 vs. 5.20, rank-sum test, p = 0.016), iii) that they are more willing to follow
their leader’s average contribution decision (6.28 vs. 4.96, rank-sum test, p = 0.0306) and
iv) that they are more satisfied with their leader’s average contribution decision (7.44
vs. 4.93, rank-sum test, p = 0.0002) in Give-R than in Take-R. Except for the last
item, however, the reported differences turn out to be insignificant in the one-shot situa-
tion. Moreover, we cannot rule out that the differences are driven by different leadership
experiences throughout the game, since they disappear as soon as we control in the cor-
responding regressions for leaders’ actual contribution decisions (as they were seen by the
respective followers in the preceding game).
There is one item, however, that is robust to including leaders’ actual decision and
that is found to be significantly different in both one-shot and repeated situations. We
asked followers to state an amount that they thought would be appropriate to contribute
as a leader. The amount is significantly higher in Give than in Take (13.83 vs. 8.75,
rank-sum test, p = 0.0017), as well as in Give-R compared to Take-R (14.74 vs. 8.5,
rank-sum test, p < 0.0001). This finding is particularly interesting, since it implies that
the same contribution decision of a leader might be perceived quite differently by followers
under the two different frames; namely if followers evaluate leaders’ actual contributions
in comparison to the contribution that they perceive as being appropriate in the respective
frame. If we additionally assume that followers act in a reciprocal manner towards the
leader’s contribution, and that their reciprocal reaction depends on the perception of
the leader’s contribution, it becomes possible to derive models that can account for the
differences in cooperation rates and revealed cooperation types between frames, as we do
observe them in our data.
In particular, revealed altruism theory (Cox et al., 2008) could be used to predict
that followers in the take-frame contribute less than followers in the give-frame. The
corresponding analysis, which is analogous to the one in Cox et al. (2013), can be found in
the appendix. Here, we only describe the basic mechanism, which is as follows: According
to revealed altruism theory, subjects evaluate actual contributions against the status quo,
i.e., the status quo serves as the comparison point. The status quo is the initial allocation
of tokens to the public good. It differs between the give-frame (zero contribution) and
the take-frame (full contribution). This implies that in the give-frame, leaders reach
a certain contribution level by giving more to the public good than in the status quo.
By contrast, in the take-frame the same contribution level is reached by taking away
from the public good, i.e., contributing less than in the status quo. Therefore, the same
contribution decision by a leader can at the same time be perceived as more generous in
the give-frame and as less generous in the take-frame. Revealed altruism theory predicts
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that subjects react more altruistic to generous actions than to ungenerous actions. When
being more altruistic translates into higher contributions, the model can thus explain
higher correlations between leader’s and followers’ contributions in give- compared to
take-frames. Accordingly, it is also capable of explaining that more subjects are classified
as conditional cooperators in Give than in Take.
3.4 Discussion
We studied the influence of positive and negative frames on leadership effectiveness in
social dilemmas with one-shot and repeated interactions. In our lab experiments, we
observed significant differences in cooperation rates between the institutional frames for
both leaders and followers. Moreover, using data from a strategy method that elicits
each follower’s contribution plan contingent on the leader’s decisions, we found that re-
vealed cooperation types were not stable between institutional frames. The observed type
distribution differed significantly between take- and give-frames. Based on self-reported
measures from ex-post questionnaires, we provided indicative evidence that the change in
cooperation behavior might have been due to differences in the perception of give- and
take-frames.
Leading-by-example, or more general a sequential move structure, has been promoted
in recent years as a potential solution to social dilemmas. Yet, the corresponding evidence
almost exclusively stems from experiments that use games with a voluntary contribution
mechanism. Our experiment supports the previous findings, since we also observe high
levels of social efficiency in the presence of leaders — but only in the give-some frame.
If the institutional frame is more like in the case of a common-pool resource (take-some
frame), cooperation rates are reduced by about 42% in the repeated game and about 50%
in the one-shot game.
Part of this loss in efficiency is due to a significant reduction in leaders’ willingness to
cooperate. Leaders set better examples in the give- than in the take-frames. One could
think that the problem would be alleviated as soon as we find a way to increase leaders’
contributions in the take-frames. However, we can observe this counterfactual because of
the strategy-method data on followers’ behavior, and prospects look bleak. We see that
the marginal impact of leaders’ decisions on followers’ contribution is significantly smaller
in the take-frame than in the give-frame. Even worse, we observe that a substantial
fraction of followers seem to change their revealed cooperation type altogether under a
take-frame, behaving like a free-rider rather than like a conditional cooperator.
The malleability of revealed cooperation types is striking. Assuming that revealed
types are also not stable across frames in other games (which, of course, remains to
be shown), one might want to be cautious in interpreting differences in aggregate data
between games—in particular when subjects’ perception of the frame changes between
games.29 As such, the potential malleability of types might constitute a challenge when
29For example, imagine that the cooperation type would be elicited in a positively-framed game (e.g.,
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trying to assess the empirical relevance of certain behavioral theories (e.g., pure outcome-
oriented models), since such tests usually need to rely on a selection of data from different
kind of games. Given the importance of such assessments, we believe that one should try
to learn more about why (or which) people react to differences in framing, so that these
relevant factors could be controlled for (e.g., see Fosgaard et al., 2014).
In this respect, our questionnaire data contain some indicative evidence why coop-
eration behavior might have changed between frames. In particular, leaders reported
different aspects to be of importance for their own decision. Moreover, followers’ per-
ception of appropriate leadership behavior differed between frames. These findings lend
support to certain classes of behavioral models that can account for the impact of changes
in subjects’ perception between frames (e.g., similar to the model of revealed altruism by
Cox et al., 2008). However, first note that this statement partly relies on differences
in self-reported measures that were elicited after the experiment. Subjects had already
experienced the situation and made their decisions, so that a causal interpretation is
not straightforward and should be subject to further investigation. Second, note that
we elicited followers’ contributions contingent only on the leader’s decisions. While this
allows for a clear focus on the leader-follower relationship, it implies that followers cannot
make their decisions contingent on the actions of the other followers. Part of the change
in followers’ contribution plans between frames, however, might be due to a corresponding
change in beliefs about other followers’ behavior. The extent to which this matters re-
mains an open question, so future studies might try to shed light on it by eliciting beliefs
about other followers’ contribution plans as well (e.g., Gächter et al., 2014).
From a policy perspective, our results might be understood as an opportunity. (Not
only) in environments where leading-by-example can be implemented or already is in
place, shifting people’s attention to the positive aspects of the situation might increase
social efficiency. This could be done by addressing people with regard to increasing coop-
eration rather than reducing free-riding, respectively. For instance, one could try telling
people to start behaving in a ‘desired’ way instead of communicating that we need to stop
behaving in an ‘undesired’ way. A specific example might be environmental protection:
instead of communicating that we are in a situation where there is too much pollution and
everyone should reduce pollution, one should rather focus on the ways to reduce pollution
and advise people to invest money/effort into these means (e.g., reducing power con-
sumption vs. increasing energy efficiency; or stop using non-renewable resources vs. start
using renewable resources; etc.). Whether this positive framing indeed outperforms the
negative frame is, of course, ultimately an empirical question which requires additional
field experiments—but our results from the lab at least point into this direction.
giving in a dictator game, contributing in a public-good game) and the main experiment under study is
set in a negative frame (e.g., sabotage in tournaments, stealing game, market game with collusion). It
might then be the case that the types elicited in the first game do not coincide with the behavior in the
main experiment. One might jump to the conclusion that motives of cooperation are unimportant in the
main experiment. Yet, maybe cooperation motives are relevant, but one just did not observe it because
the different framings induced too many differences in revealed cooperation types.
79
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Individual contribution plans
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3.5.2 Individual Groups (GIVE-R and TAKE-R)
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3.5.3 Theoretical predictions - Revealed altruism
In this section, we want to demonstrate that theoretical models exist which predict that,
given a certain contribution by a leader (gL), followers in a give-frame contribute more
(gGF ) than followers in a take-frame (gTF ). We assume reciprocal preferences as defined in
revealed altruism theory (Cox et al., 2008). The proof is analogous to the proof of Propo-
sition 5 in Cox et al. (2013). In the following we focus on the leader-follower relationship
and abstract from any assumptions about follower’s beliefs about other followers, i.e., we
focus on the ’net effect’ of leadership. Furthermore, we focus on a one-shot game setting
as in the Give and Take treatments. Axiom R of the theory states that agents react
more altruistic toward another agent when that agent chooses a more generous option.
In our setting it is straightforward to establish that a contribution gL,A from the leader
is more generous than (MGT) a contribution gL,B if gL,A > gL,B.
Option A is perceived by the follower as more generous than (MGT) option B if the
following two properties hold:
(i) m∗A −m∗B ≥ 0
(ii) m∗A −m∗B ≥ y∗A − y∗B
with m∗X being the follower’s maximum possible payoff when the leader chooses option
X, i.e., when he is contributing a certain amount gXL and y∗X being the leader’s maximum
possible payoff when choosing option X. Let e be each player’s endowment, gL be the
leader’s contribution, gi the contribution of a specific follower and G−i the sum of the
contribution of the other followers with n players in total giving an MPCR of a/n.
(i) m∗A −m∗B = e+
a
N
(gAL +G−i)− [e+
a
N
(gBL +G−i)]
= a
N
(gAL − gBL ) ≥ 0
⇔ gAL ≥ gBL
(ii) m∗A −m∗B ≥ y∗A − y∗B
⇔ a
N
(gAL − gBL ) ≥ (
a
N
− 1)(gAL − gBL )
⇔ gAL ≥ gBL
This means that the higher the contribution of the leader the more generous this is
perceived and the more altruistic the follower should react (i.e., the follower should react
with weakly higher contributions). The most generous option the leader can choose is
to contribute everything in the Give frame and withdraw nothing in the Take frame.
The important difference between the two frames is how the leader reaches a specific
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contribution. In Give every contribution higher than zero is more generous than (MGT)
the status-quo and should therefore make the followers more altruistic. In Take every
amount lower than full contribution is less generous than the status-quo and should make
followers less altruistic than they would be in a neutral case (e.g., when the leader is
not choosing the contribution level himself). Being more (less) altruistic in this context
simply means contributing weakly more (less) to the public good oneself.
We denote gTF (gL) as the preferred contribution by the follower in the take treatment
(i.e., the amount that is not withdrawn) conditional on the contribution by the leader.
Likewise gGF (gL) denotes the preferred contribution in Give conditional on the leader’s
contribution. Let gNF (gL) be a followers preferred contribution if the leader’s action would
be decided by chance, i.e., when reciprocal preferences should not play a role. In this case
Axiom R would not apply so gNF (gL) is the same in both frames. If the same contribution
is now chosen by the leader, we get for each gL:
gTF (gL) ≤ gNF (gL)
gGF (gL) ≥ gNF (gL)
From this we get gGF (gL) ≥ gTF (gL) for every gL concluding the proof. QED
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3.5.4 Instructions
The original instructions in German are available from the authors upon request. Below
is the English translation of the instructions used in treatment Give. Differences in the
instructions in treatment Take are marked by square brackets ”[...]“.
General information
You are participating in a study on economic decision-making. If you read the follow-
ing explanations carefully, you can earn a substantial amount of money. It is therefore
very important that you read these explanations carefully and understand them.
During the study no communication of any kind is allowed. If you have any questions,
please indicate it and raise your hand. We will come to you and answer your question in
private, so that the other participants will not be disturbed.
The study consists of exactly two parts. Information on the second part will be handed
out to you after you have completed part one. The first part features a quiz. The quiz
consists of 20 multiple-choice questions with four given answers each, of which one is the
correct solution. Please indicate for each question the answer that you think is correct.
Please confirm each of your answers by clicking “OK” in order to proceed to the next
question. As soon as all participants have completed the quiz in part one of the study,
you receive the instructions for part two.
Do you have any questions?
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Information on part two of the study
In part two, all monetary amounts are presented in Taler. At the end of the study, the
Taler you have earned will be converted into Euro and paid out to you. The conversion
rate is 1 Taler = 0.2 Euro. In addition to the earnings from part two, every participant
receives a show-up fee of 4 Euro.
At the beginning of the study, all participants are randomly matched into groups of four.
Accordingly, except for yourself, three other participants belong to your group. Every
participant has to decide how to allocate a certain amount of Taler between two different
accounts. The first account is a private account. The second account is a public account
(group account) for all group members. A participant’s payoff at the end of the study is
composed of these two accounts, i.e.:
your payoff = 1 * no. of Taler in your private account
+ 0.4 * no. of Taler in the group’s public account
Initially, there are 0 Taler [80 Taler] in the public account of your group (group account)
and 20 Taler [0 Taler] in your private account. Each participant has to decide how many
Taler he wants to contribute to [withdraw for himself from] the group account. Every
participant can contribute [withdraw] an integer amount between 0 and 20 Taler to [from]
the group account.
Every Taler that you do not contribute to the group account remains on your private
account. [Every Taler that you withdraw from the group account is put into your private
account.] After all participants have made their decisions, the Taler in your group account
are multiplied by the factor 1.6 and distributed equally among all four group members.
Your payoff from the group account thus increases [decreases] by 0.4 Taler for each Taler
that you contribute to [withdraw from] the group account. At the same time also the
payoffs of the three other members of your group increase [decrease] by 0.4 Taler, because
they receive payoffs from the group account as well.
Participants make their decisions sequentially. In each group, one participant is the first
to decide. This is the participant who, out of all four group members, has answered the
most quiz questions correctly. Before this participant’s decision is revealed to the other
three group members, these latter have to decide for each of the 21 possible contribution
[withdrawal] decisions how many Taler they want to contribute to [withdraw from] the
group account themselves. Of course, when you make the 21 decisions, you do not know
which one will become relevant. Therefore, you should consider each decision carefully.
Only after all participants have entered their decisions, the contribution [withdrawal] de-
cision of the first participant is revealed. This decision and the decisions of the three
other group members for this situation finally determine the participants’ payoffs.
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To further familiarize you with the procedure, the decision screens are presented be-
low. Moreover, in a few seconds some additional control questions will appear on your
screen. Afterwards, the second part of this study begins. After finishing the second part,
we will ask you to fill out a short questionnaire. This questionnaire constitutes the final
part of today’s study. Afterwards you will be informed about your payoff, which will be
paid to you in private.
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